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ABSTRACT
The problem of this study was to investigate the effects
of dyadic attraction upon the coalescing behavior of three-
person groups. I^adio attraction was expected to Influence
both the frequency with which coalitions were initiated and
formed and the agreed upon division of a monetary payoff.
Interpersonal attraction was conceived in terms of out-
comes, rewards minus costs, experienced in the process of
interacting. One person *s attraction for another was seen
as varying directly with the reward-cost ratio he experienced
in his interactions with that person. Based on this exchange
theory of interaction, a distinction was made between three
types of relationships: non-formed (strangers), in which
there was no prior dyadic experience or attraction; forming
(acquaintances), in which some Involvement and prior
experience was reported; and formed (friends), in which
greater Involvement, commitment and obligations were
reciprocated.
Two major coalition theories were considered; minimum
resource and minimum power theories. Minimum resource theory
predicts that coalitions will form in which the total resources
or powers are as small as possible while still being sufficient
to control the outcomes. Payoffs are divided according to a
parity norm *— the belief that a person ought to get from an
agreement an amount proportionate to what he brought into it.
Minimum power theory emphasizes a rational analysis of the
outcomes. A person's pivotal power is the proportion of times
his resources can change a losing coalition into a winning one.
It was predicted that friends and acquaintances would be
more cooperative in an experimental game than would strangers,
but that friends would be more competitive than acquaintances.
Cooperative behavior was defined as a high frequency of dyad
Initiations and alliances together with proportionate
divisions of the payoff. It was further predicted that males
would be more competitive than females.
Sixty same-sex groups were composed of two friends
(or
two acquaintances) and one stranger,
Attracted dyads were reciprocal soclometrlc choices,
competitive board game was used similar
cames like Parchesl. Resources of 3 $ and 2 were
assign
equally often to all subjects before each of twelve game .
xl
?Sr ^changeable
As predicted, friend dyads Initiated and formed more
coalitions than stranger control dyads. But contrary to
expectations, acquaintance dyads did not coalesce morefrequently than friend or stranger dyads. Moreover, dyadsdid not differ In their divisions of payoff. Friends played
to maximize their Joint outcomes, while acquaintances and
strangers generally played to maximize their Individual
outcomes. While males Initiated and formed significantly
more coalitions than females, no differences were found In
the divisions of payoff. Both males and females adhered to
the parity norm.
Support for minimum resource theory was obtained from
(1) stranger control dyads, (2) coalitions Initiated and
formed during the first block of three games. (3) divisions
of payoff throughout the twelve games, and {h) recipients of
coalition offers. Minimum power predictions were supported
by (1) changes In the frequency of coalitions initiated suid
formed after the first block of games, and (2) friend dyads.
It was concluded that friends were more cooperative than
acquaintances because they found It financially more rewarding
to cooperate them to compete. The monetary payoff made It
too costly for friends not to cooperate. It was suggested
that friends would rival and compete against one another only
In situations of low cost to their relationship. It was also
concluded that males were generally concerned with winning
(exploitative behavior) whereas females were more concerned
with arriving at an equitable outcome (accommodative behavior).
Finally, It was concluded that minimum resource theorj^
currently offers the best explanation of coalescing behavior.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The development of experimental researoh with small
social groups has been accompanied by an Increasing Interest
In the effects of various Intra-group relationships on the
performance of Individual members and of the group-as-a-
whole (l^lbaut & Kelley, 1959) . Experimental studies of
coalition formation have been recipients of this Interest.
As In other small group research, numerous experimental
situations have been studied employing designs which range
from observations of member Interactions to empirically
quantifiable methods. For the most part, however, research
has neglected prior existing relationships among coalition
participants. One key relationship Is the degree of liking
among gi*oup members. Only one study has Investigated the
effect of prior associations upon the frequency of coalition
formation (Garrison, 196lb). In this study all groups were
composed of three men from one fraternity house and two
from another. No attempt was made to systematically vary
the degree of liking among the fraternity brothers.
The problem of the present study was to Investigate the
effects of dyadic attraction upon the coalescing behavior of
three-person groups. I^adlc attraction was expected to
Influence both the frequency with which coalitions were
2Initiated and formed and the agreed upon division of a mone-
tary payoff.
It Is suggested that outcomes In an Interpersonal
situation are more predictable when one Interacts with an
acquaintance or friend than when one Interacts with a
stranger. Therefore, It does not seem unreasonable to expect
coalescing behavior to vary as a function of the degree of
attraction among group members. Thlbaut and Kelley (1959)
also "speculate that a close friendship heightens expecta-
tions that the coalition will be effective by Increasing
each person *s feeling that he can take for granted or
readily Induce the other person *s support for his actions.
It Is also likely that close friendship reflects a more
complete correspondence of outcomes or commonality of
Interests" (pp. 209-210).
A three-person experimental setting was selected for
this study because of the various Inter-relatlonshlps which
could be analyzed. Both two- and three-person situations
allow the participants to compete and bargain over available
rewards or to work cooperatively toward Joint rewarding
outcomes. However, three-person situations, such as a
coalition formation game, are not restricted to dyadic
Interactions. A third person may actively participate In
the bargaining. This person not only enters Into the
dynamic aspects of the game, but also becomes an alternativ
e
for the other participants. This Is particularly
Important
3
when dyads varying In attraction are placed Into a competi-
tive game setting. Each member of the dyad has available to
him another person with whom he can Interact and bargain.
In Slmmel's (1950) terms
^
the third person can become an
Intermediary between the other two. It Is also possible
that the attracted dyad will band together against the third
person, or that It may split, with one member of the dyad
coalescing with the third person.
Chapter II presents theory and research relevant to
Interpersonal attraction. Based upon an exchange theory of
Interaction, a distinction Is made among non-formed relation-
ships (strangers), forming relationships (acquaintances),
and formed relationships (friends). Differential effects of
varying degrees of attraction upon behaviors emitted In a
competitive game setting are considered. Chapter III
reviews and contrasts three theories of coalition formation:
minimum resource theory, minimum power theory, and anti-
competitive theory. Several general conclusions are made
based on relevant empirical evidence. Hypotheses which
guided this study are also presented.
Chapter IV describes the experimental design and
procedure as well as the coalition game played by the three-
person group. Chapter V analyzes the results obtained from
the experimental situation by groups and by dyads varying
In attraction. Findings relevant to the three theories of
coalition formation are also presented. Finally, Chapter
VI
disouBses and interprets the results In relation to the
attraction and coalition theories. Methodological
I %
considerations and further x*esearch are also discussed.
CHAPTER II
INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION! THEORY AND RESEARCH
Theory and research relating to Interpersonal attraction
may be categorized Into antecedents (determinants) and con-
sequences (effects). Unfortunately, the major emphasis has
been upon the antecedents rather than upon the consequences
of Interpersonal attraction. As a result, "compared with
the empirical findings regarding the antecedents of liking,
those relevant to consequences are far less clear-cut and
definitive. This is reflected in the relative lack of
theoretical concern with the effects of attraction" (Lott &
Lott, 1965, P. 299).
The present study Is primarily concerned with the
effects of varying degrees of attraction upon behavior In a
competitive setting. Will a person behave differently In a
face-to-face competitive situation If he is with a friend or
an acquaintance rather than a stranger? In the theoretical
discussion which follows, a distinction Is made among non-
formed, forming, and formed relationships. It Is suggested
that the point In time at which a relationship exists Is a
major determlnemt of the behavior of those comprising the
relationship. If the amount of attraction between two
persons can be determined, one ought to be able to
predict
the nature of their individual or Joint behaviors
in competitive
6
situations.
The researoh section of this chapter reviews empirical
evidence on the effects of varying degrees of attraction
upon cooperative-competitive behavior. Uttle relevant
research has been conducted. That which has been reported
was concerned with the Prisoner's Dilemma situation, a two-
person competitive gcune. For a broader and more Inclusive
review of the literature, particularly with regard to the
antecedents and consequences of attraction, the reader Is
referred to Byrne (196?) and Lott and Lott (I965),
Theory
Among the more Important aspects of social life are
the Interpersonal relationships that one forms with others
in his environment. From our past experiences we know that
some relationships are highly rewarding and that our Involve-
ment In them Is facilitated by the high returns we receive
from them. Other relationships may prove very costly to us
and our continued Involvement In them depends upon whether
we consider the demands made of us to be reasonable. In
other words, we tend to form and remain In relationships
which provide us with high outcomes; where the costs incurred
are less than the rewards received.
Interpersonal attraction, then, is conceived In terms
of rewards and costs experienced In the process of Interacting
(Homans, I96I; Secord Ss Backman, 196^; Thlbaut & Kelley, 1959)
•
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The attraction of one person for another will vary directly
with the reward-cost ratio he experiences In his Interactions
with that person. Attraction is also a positive function of
Interaction: the greater the Interaction^ the greater the
attraction (Lott & Lott^ 1965). By definition. Interaction
Implies mutual or reciprocal Influence, The actions of each
person affect the other. They must communicate with each
other, reward each other, and generally satisfy each other's
expectations. The relationship is essentially an exchange;
Its participants are continually in the process of trading
rewards and costs, i.e., bargaining. Reciprocity, then. Is
considered a necessary condition for liking.
It is assumed that every individual voluntarily enters
and remains in a relationship only as long as It Is adequately
satisfactory In terms of his rewards and costs. Outcomes
(rewards minus costs) must be above a minimal level of what
a person feels he deserves. This level is a standard against
which his satisfaction is Judged and against which other
potential relationships are compared. The greater the satis-
faction with their relationship, the less likely either person
is to choose another relationship to replace it. Each person
is restrained from breaking or leaving the relationship by
barriers and forces imposed upon him by other relationships
and societal norms. The relationship will be altered or
broken if one's expectations are not fulfilled and another
relationship is perceived as providing higher outcomes than
8
the present one. Thus, a person evaluates a relationship on
the basis of his previous experience In similar relationships
and on the basis of other relationships alternatively available
to him.
Interpersonal relationships are of a progressive natural
those that continue generally become Increasingly Involved
and mutually dependent. Thus, It Is assumed that attraction
will vary over time. It will begin at zero when the Individ-
uals first meet and will Increase monotonlcally with time
until some stable level Is achieved by the Interacting
persons (Levlnger, I967). This level will be reached and
will become relatively stable only after each person has had
the opportunity to experience a broad range of outcomes In
his Interactions with the other person.
The preceding theoretical background provides the basis
for distinguishing among non-formed, forming, and formed
relationships. In this study non-formed relationships are
referred to as strangers. When strsingers first meet it is
assumed that their mutual attraction approximates zero.
Iimnedlately they begin to exchange information. Each explores
the behavior of the other In an attempt to achieve mutually
rewarding outcomes. As their relationship pi*ogresses, the
strangers continue to exchange information and sample out-
comes. If the outcomes are satisfactory, interaction will
continue; if not, an alternative relationship may be
considered.
9
Forming relationships, represented in this study by
acquaintances, are those in which some involvement is
observed as the individuals reciprocate rewarding behavior.
Each acquaintance Invests himself more fully into the relation-
ship and becomes more dependent upon it. Each person attempts
to improve the other person's outcomes by lowering that
person's costs in the exchange. As such behavior is recip-
rocated, greater depth in the relationship is achieved.
Close friends typify formed relationships, those char-
acterized by internally felt attractions and obligations.
Involvement leads to commitment and even greater depth in
the relationship. Interpersonal trust develops and the
friends exchange personal and confidential Information.
The sampling of alternative relationships is reduced as each
person's investment becomes greater.
This distinction among strangers, acquaintances, and
friends is one of degree. It is suggested that dyads of
varying degrees of attraction may emit different types of
behavior in a competitive game setting. More specifically,
friends and acquaintances are expected to be more cooperative
in an experimental game than strangers. Moreover, friends
expected to be more competitive than acquaintances. Let
us consider each of these expectations. The focus will be
upon differences in degree of liking as they affect cooperative-
competitive behavior.
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Empirical research has consistently shown that strangers
In a competitive game attempt to maximize their rewards and
minimize their costs* Each person obtains for himself the
most favorable outcomes possible. This Is particularly true
If no further Interaction Is anticipated with the other
participants; with minimal Interpersonal restraints, each
person 1s free to employ a strategy maximizing his outcomes.
For example, numerous studies using the Prisoner’s Dilemma
paradigm have reported greater competition than cooperation
within stranger dyads. In fact, competitive behavior generally
Increased with time (trials) rather than decreasing. Further-
more, it has been shown that if one person is always or
unconditionally cooperative in the situation he vjlll be
exploited even more by the other participants than if he had
been partially or conditionally cooperative (Solomon, i960)*
In other cooperative-competitive situations similar
results have been obtained. The studies conducted by
Vlnacke and colleagues, discussed in Chapter III> are In
general agreement with the above findings. In addition, these
studies found males to behave in a consistently exploitative
manner while females were more accommodative In their behavior.
Deutsoh and Krauss' (i960) research dealing with the effects
of threat upon cooperative-competitive behavior further docu-
ments these findings. Among strangers, the prevailing
strategy
in a trucking game was for each person to maximize
his outcomes
Since most of the studies were conducted on large
university
campuses. It can be assumed that the strangers
perceived their
11
relationship with the other participant (a) as belnc confined
to the experimental situation and, therefore, of short
duration. Each person was relatively Independent of the
other participants and his behavior was governed or controlled
by social and Interpersonal restraints.
Unlike strangers, friends and acquaintances are aware
of, and may be affected by, the duration of their relationship,
Khowlng that one will continue to Interact with the other
Participant ( 8 ) outside of the experimental situation may
significantly affect his behavior while participating In the
experiment. His behavior will also be siffected by his previous
associations with the other participant (s ) . For example, he
may have been In competitive situations with them before and
may remember the outcomes he derived from that experience.
Even If members of the relationship had previously engaged In
few or no competitive situations, there Is still a "pool" of
previous Interpersonal behaviors from other situations upon
which they can draw Inferences applicable to the present
competitive situation. In other words, a person possesses
expectations about the type of behavior his friend or acquaintance
will exhibit In a situation. He will structure his behavior
on the basis of these expectations In order to obtain the
highest possible outcomes.
Friends and acquaintances, then, expect to continue their
Interaction following the experimental situation. Moreover,
their past associations should allow them to communicate more
12
freely with one another during the experimental game.
Positive affect toward others is likely to be associated
with a high amount of communication; friends communicate
more with friends than with strangers (Back, 1951; Secord &
Backman, 1964), Klein (1956), too, has shown that in informal
friendship groups the affect structure closely resembles the
communication structure. Similarly, as a group’s attractive-
ness increases, pressures to communicate also increase
(Festlnger, 1950), In balance theory terms, when one person
likes another, the liked person will be approached or
contacted, will be benefited or helped, and will be perceived
as benefiting the llker (Heider, 1958)
.
Thus, the first expectation finds considerable support
in the experimental literature; friends and acquaintances
will be more cooperative than strangers in a competitive
game situation. The second expectation is less intuitive;
friends are expected to be more competitive than acquaintances
in a laboratory game setting.
Acquaintances, in the process of forming their relation-
ship, are relatively insecure and lack the stability and
security of friends who have been intimately associated with
one another for several years. Friends, having committed
themselves to their relationship, have developed interpersonal
trust and confidence in their partner. Because of the devel-
oped nature of their relationship, the friends can oppose
and
rival one another in a competitive game situation without
endangering their friendship. However, conflict
and
13
dlsacreement could Jeopardize the forming relationship of
acquaintances. Even In laboratory game situations, acquaintances
are expected to avoid conflict and to strive toward uniformity
and agreement In order to make their relationship more secux*e.
and overt aggressiveness Is vei*y costly while a
relationship Is forming
€md must be avoided If possible,
Flather, the furtherance of the acquaintances* relationship Is
dependent upon the exchange of rewarding behaviors. Each
person attempts to Improve the other person's outcomes by
lowering that person's costs In the exchange. Each partner
moves the other through a relatively great number of reward-
cost units above the minimal level which that person feels he
deserves (Thlbaut & Kelley, 1959).
Friends, then, can withstand more conflict and strife
than the more tentative relationships of acquaintances.
Friends realize their relationship Is secure and unthreatened
by their competitive behavior. In spite of Interpersonal
norms which regulate and maintain the relationship, each
friend is permitted to deviate within an acceptable latitude
from the established norms. Occasionally, even aggressive
behavior which results In lower outcomes Is permitted.
Qamson (1961b), for example, reported that some of the subjects in
his study "preferred to take their chances vjith a stranger
rather than to bargain with a 'difficult' fraternity brother"
(p. 400). Berkowltz (1958) 1 too, suggested that Hieing among
group members has the effect of lowering Inhibitions with
regard to aggressive behavior
.
It is suggested that a type of credit Is created In
formed relationships which allows each to lower the outcomes
of his partner in certain situations without threatening the
cohesiveness of the relationship, A competitive game setting
is one such situation. The usual conflicts aroused by a
game are relatively non-costly to the relationship and fall
within the acceptable limits of the partners' credits. To
^ observer, amd to the friends themselves for that matter,
the amount of conflict displayed at any particular time
diirlng the game may be quite great.
In high cohesiveness both the ability to make demands
and the ability to resist them are greater than in low
cohesiveness. Therefore, a potentiality for conflict
exists in high cohesiveness. This theoretical ex-
pectation is borne out by Back’s finding that his
highly cohesive dyads showed not only more strenuous
Influence attempts but also greater overt resistance
to Influence than did his less cohesive dyads
(Thlbaut & Kelley, 1959, PP. 114-115).
While friends are expected to be more competitive than
acquaintances, they are also expected to be more cooperative
than strangers. Friends continue to interact following the
experiment and are less likely to be as exploitative as
strangers. Essentially, cooperation and competition are on
a continuum with strangers being the most competitive, then
friends, and finally’' acquaintances. It should also be men-
tioned that the expected competitiveness of friends is re-
stricted to sltuatlona which do not threaten the existence of the
relationship. If the situation is extremely salient or the
association is threatened with survival, the more developed
and intimate the relationship, the greater will be
the
15
cooperative behavior. Roommates and marriage mates, for
example, will cooperate to a high degree when confronted
with a stressful experience such as bodily Injury, loss of
valuable possessions, ejb cetera
. Acquaintances and dating
couples would not be expected to exhibit the same degree of
cooperative behavior. But, most competitive situations are
much less severe in their consequences than these. Certainly,
laboratory game situations are much more moderate In their
demands upon a relationship. While motivation In real world
conflicts may be very high, this Is generally not the case
In most experimental studies (Qallo & McCllntook, 1965).
A distinction, derived from exchange theory, has been
made among non-formed relationships (strangers), forming
relationships (acquaintances), and formed relationships
(friends). Differential effects of these varying degrees
of attraction upon behaviors In a competitive setting were
given. Friends and acquaintances are expected to be more
cooperative In an experimental game than strangers; however,
friends are expected to be more competitive than acquaintances.
Research
The question posed in the Introduction to this chapter
asked If a person would behave differently in a competitive
situation If he were with a friend or an acquaintance rather
than a stranger. The theoretical section of this chapter
suggested an affirmative answer and discussed different
behaviors which were expected to result as a function of
the
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degree of attraction. This review Is restricted to relation-
ships In which some Interpersonal Involvement preceded the
experimental situation. The competitive behavior of strangers
encountering each other for the first time In a game situation
has already been documented.
In a recent study, McCllntock and McNeel (1967) concluded
that prior dyadic experience, whether hostile or friendly,
was an Important determinant of cooperative-competitive be-
havior. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three
pregame conditions: no prior experience, friendly prior
experience, and hostile prior experience. Subjects with
friendly prior experience were significantly more cooperative
In a Maximizing Difference Game than those with hostile or
no prior experience. Prior success or failure has also been
found to Influence subjects* competitive behavior (Harrison &
McCllntock, 1965). Dyads playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
were significantly more cooperative In their behavior If
they had experienced success Immediately prior to the game
than If they had experienced failure or had no prior experience.
Moreover, dyads who had a one-week delay between their success
or failure experience and the game situation still displayed
more cooperative behavior than dyads with no prior experience.
This was true regardless of whether the prior experience had
been a success or a failure.
The preceding experiments Illustrate the effects of
prior dyadic experiences on cooperative-competitive behavior.
In both of these experiments, however, prior experiences
were
17
artificially manipulated between stranr.era
. it la doubtful
that their relatlonahlpa could have progreaaed very far in
their short pregame Interaction. Yet, even this encounter
resulted In greater cooperative behavior. What effect would
real-life relationships established some time prior to an
experiment have upon the participants* behaviors?
Two studies are particularly relevant to this question.
The first demonstrated that the maintenance of cooperative
behavior In interpersonal situations was affected by an
Interaction between the subject's perception of his partner's
cooperativeness and the preexisting affective relationship
existing between them (Swingle, 1966). The behavior of an
uncooperative partner resulted In a reduction In a subject's
level of cooperative responding when the partner was either
liked or unknown, but the initial level of cooperativeness
was maintained when the partner was disliked.
Swingle interpreted his findings according to a congrulty
model of social interaction (Pestinger, 1957). Friends In a
competitive game situation might be expected to maintain or
restore cognitive consistency rather than adopt an optimal
strategy to maximize their Individual payoffs. When a friend
"harms** his partner, cognitive Inconsistency exists and the
harmed partner seeks a means for resolving the inconsistency.
Friends would be highly resistant to negative attitude change
and another means for restoring consonance would be
sought.
The harmed partner could reciprocate the harm or
retaliate,
thereby maintaining the original positive attitude
toward
18
his friend. The retaliation oould be perceived as horseplay,
fatigue, or some other Innocuous redefinition of his behavior
which Is not Inconsistent with their friendship. Retaliation
maintains the Integrity of their relationship by serving as
a dissonance reduction mechanism.
On the other hand, strangers who have neither Interacted
prior to the experiment nor expect to after Its completion
should act In their own self-interests and maximize their
individual payoffs. Minimal dissonance would result from
retaliating against an unknown person who had been malevolent.
In keeping with the theoretical discussion presented earlier.
Swingle's findings support the notion that both best friends
and strangers will be competitive In an experimental game
situation. However, the relationships will differ In two
important respects: (a) friends' competitiveness will be of
a pseudo nature while strangers' will tend toward a maxi-
mization of self-interest, and (b) friends will maintain
their mutual positive attitudes toward each other v;hile
strangers' attitudes will undergo a negative change.
The second study Is perhaps the most relevant to the
question of the effect of real-life relationships upon game
behavior. Oskamp and Perlman (19^6) manipulated the degree
of friendship in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. On the basis of
a sociometric "Questionnaire on Friendship", four experimental
groups were designated — best friends, acquaintances, non-
acquaintances or strangers, and disliked Individuals. Male
19
students from Claremont Men's college (business orientation)
and Pomona College (liberal arts orientation) served as sub-
jects* A strong positive relationship betvjeen degree of friend-
ship and amount of cooperation was found for Pcmiona subjects*
Claremont subjects^ on the other hand« showed an inverse re-
lationship; best friends were least cooperative by far and
the other groups did not differ from each other.
These results illustrate the complexities of research in
the area of cooperation-competition* One could interpret the
findings as supporting either a positive or a negative relation-
ship between interpersonal attraction amd cooperative game
behavior* Perhaps lincontrolled situational variables caused
the discrepant findings* In a post hoc explanation of the
results, Oskamp and Perlman (1966) suggest that the business
versus liberal arts orientations of the two colleges may be
the best interpretation of the observed differences. However,
it is questionable whether this interpretation can be general-
ized to other experimental situations which measure cooperative-
competitive behavior* It is not clear whether friendship
affected the subjects* responses or whether some condition
peculiar to either of the two colleges influenced the observed
behavior*
The preceding research suggests that real-life relation-
ships established prior to an experiment do have an effect
upon the participants' cooperative-competitive behaviors. The
specific nature of this effect depends upon the degree of
20
attraction among the participants. Thus, It seems
reasonable to hypothesize that a person's behavior In a
competitive game situation will be affected by his feelings
toward the other partlclpant(s)
.
<
•
I .
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CHAPTER III
COALITION FORMATION; THEORY AND RESEARCH
The teiTO coalition has had rather broad usage « refer-
ring, at times, to mere Joint participation by or more
persons* Thus, either a basketball team or t>io businessmen
playing golf might be said to have formed a coalition for
both groups have "a temporary alliance for Joint action"
(Webster, 1956). Slmmel (1950), in contrasting the dyad
with the triad, discussed how each of three persons could
operate as a mediator between the other two. Recent writers
(e.g.. Mills, 1953; 195^) have Interpreted Slmmel»s dis-
cussion as suggesting that the most elementary differentiating
tendency of a three-person aiggregate is their segregation
Into a pair and €m other. According to this interpretation,
a coalition is formed whenever a group Is subdivided Into
subparts. It Is important to note that the basis for the
subdivision is not specified and presumably changes from
situation to situation, from group to group. One is currently
made aware of the broad application of the term when he hears
about a coalition government being formed, a coalition between
labor and management ensuring the passage of a law, and so on.
This use tends to emphasize the attainment of some common
goal through coordinated action (Borgatta & Borgatta, 19^3)
•
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A more restricted definition of coalition la used in
this study. The basis upon which subdivisions occur within
a group is that of power or influence. This assumption leads
to a narrower definition; the term coalition is used to mean
”the Joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a
decision,,," (Qamson, 19^4, p, 82), Resources are the raw
materials possessed by each individual in the group. These
are often referred to as an individual's power. Experimentally
these resources may be weights, votes, sets of questions and
answers, etc, assigned by the experimenter (E) to the subjects
(^s) prior to the experiment. If two or more Ss in a group
agree to combine their resources so that their Joint influence
or power changes the outcomes in the situation, they have
formed a coalition. Individuals form coalitions in order that
their own interests, unattainable by separate action, might
be obtained through Joint action. This may require two or
more to cooperate rather than compete so that the outcome
is Improved for all participants in the agreement.
The definition advanced above needs to be further re-
stricted so that the nature of the situations in which
coalitions can be expected to form is more clearly specified.
It is not meaningful, for example, to speak of coalition
formation in a purely coordinated or cooperative situation.
If the interests and powers of all group members are identical
l.e., achieving a solution which maximizes the outcomes
for
all individuals, there is no need for the group to
subdivide
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for all would be contributing to the achievement of the goal.
Similarly, it is not meaningful to speak of coalition formation
in a purely conflicting or competitive situation. In this
case, an individual cannot enhEince his outcomes any more by
forming a coalition than he can by not forming one. It is
meaningful, therefore, to speak of coalition formation only
when there are elements of both cooperation and competition
present. Such a situation has come to be called a mixed-
motive situation.
,,, there is an element of conflict, since there exists
no outcome which maximizes the payoffs to everybody.
There is an element of coordination, since there exists
for at least two of the players the possibility that
they can do better by coordinating their resources
than by acting alone (Gamson, 196^, p. 85).
A coalition, then, is "the Joint use of resources to determine
the outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation in-
volving more than two /personqT” (Gamson, 1964, p, 85).
Theory
Several psychologists and sociologists have attempted
to develop theories of coalition formation. As a result,
two distinct theories have emerged in the literature to-
gether with a third post hoc explanation. 'Hils section
reviews and contrasts the assumptions made by these theories.
The research section attempts to summarize their relevant
empirical evidence,
Caplow (1956, 1959) was the first to develop a theory
of coalition formation which accounted for the
differences
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among group members In their power relationships. Ho de-
sorlbes eight power relationships in which members of a
three-person group might find themselves. All three members
may be equal in perceived power, one may be stronger than
the other two combined, or one may be perceptibly stronger
than the other two individually but less powerful when the
latter two are allied. He assumes as a basic premise that
the formation of any coalition depends upon the initial dis-
tribution of power among group members. Caplow's eight power
relationships systematically vary the initial power of the
group members. On the basis of the power distribution, he
predicts which two persons are most likely to form a coalition.
Caplow*s theory, then, emphasizes the initial resources which
group members bring to or are assigned to in a particular
situation. Coalitions are formed on the basis of the per-
ceived strength of the participants; each person manipulates
the position in which he initially finds himself.
The preceding theoretical formulations of Caplow have
been more explicitly stated by damson (I96la, 19^4). Both
theorists predict identical coalitions in all but one power
relationship. That relationship, which is of primary concern
in this study, has the following properties; A >B > C,
A^ (B + C). Caplow predicts that the AC and BC dyads will
occur equally often, while damson predicts that only BC will
occur. Recently, Chertkoff (196?) has revised Caplow's
theory. According to his revision, AC will occur half as
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frequently as will BC. An AB coalition Is never expected to
occur. Differences among these theorists will become more
prominent during the presentation and discussion of results.
The Important point to be noted here Is that, for the power
relationship used In this study, different coalitions are
expected to be formed depending upon one's theoretical position.
All of these theorists, however, emphasize the Initial
distribution of resources. The position which they represent
Is known as minimum resource theory (Gamson, 196^^). The
central hypothesis of the theory Is that a coalition will form
in which the total resources are as small as possible while
still being sufficient to control the outcome, Gamson goes
beyond Caplow and Chertkoff In specifying not only v/ho will
coalesce or ally with whom, but also how they will divide the
payoff. He postulates a parity norm to account for the belief
of group members that an Individual ought to get from an
agreement an amount proportional to what he brought Into It.
"Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition
a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources
which they contribute to a coalition" (Gamson, 1961a, p. 376 ).
In the language of other theorists the parity norm principle
Is equivalent to Homans* {196I) principle of distributive
Justice, Thlbaut and Kelley's ( 1959 ) definition of comparison
level, and Adams' (I965) conceptualization of Inequity. In
summai^, minimum resource theory emphasizes the initial dis-
tribution of resources. The coalition which forms will have
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total resources as small as possible while still being able
to control the outcome. Payoff will be distributed among the
participants of the coalition so that each receives an amount
proportional to his Initial resources.
A second prominent theory of coalition formation empha-
sizes a rational analysis by the participants of the final out-
come of the situation. This position draws Its strength from
research In the mathematical theory of games (e.g.. Luce &
Ralffa, 1957; Rapoport & Orwant, 19^2; von Neumann & Morgen-
stern, 196^). In the present discussion It shall be referred
to as minimum power theoa:*y. a label provided by Qamson (1964).
The theory suggests that the relative power of the partici-
pants may be equal even though their initial resources differ.
Each person possesses pivotal powers the proportion of times
hlB resources can change a losing coalition Into a winning
one. Thus, power Is defined not In terms of Initial resources
but In terms of the ntimber of "winning” coalitions a person
could form with other persons. For example, If person A
could be In a winning coalition only If he allied with B,
he has less power than person B who could be In a winning
coalition by allying with A, C, and D. In this example, B
has a more strategic bargaining position than does A; B's
pivotal power Is three, while A*s is one. Therefore, according
to minimum power theory. If participants are equal In pivotal
power no one coalition Is more likely to be formed than any
other. This Is the prediction regardless of the initial
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distribution of resources. In the power relationship given
above, A >B >C where A< (B + C), all participants are of
equal pivotal power. Thus, equal frequencies of coalescing
are predicted: AB * AC » BC.
Minimum power theoi*y also specifies the manner in which
a winning coalition will divide the payoff it receives. Each
participant will demand a shai»e proportional to his pivotal
power. Therefore, if allies are equal in pivotal power the
payoff will be divided evenly among them even though their
resources differ. In summary, minimum power theory emphasizes
a rational approach to the understanding of the outcome of one's
behavior in a competitive situation. The coalition which
forme will be the one with the smallest total pivotal power —
a result of the strategic bargaining positions of the partici-
pants. Payoff will be distributed among the participants of
the coalition so that each receives an amount proportional
to his pivotal power.
Both minimum resource theory and minimum power theory
consider power or Influence to be basic to the explanation of
coalition formation. However, the former conceives of power
as residing in the initial distribution of resources among
the participants, while the latter conceives of power as the
frequency with which one can use his resources to achieve a
profitable outcome. Both theories predict which coalitions
are most likely to form and how the allies will divide
the
payoff among themselves. Such derivations are minimal
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requirements of any serious theory of coalition formation.
The baslo conceptual difference between the two theories Is
in the strategy which group members are expected to pursue.
According to minimum resource theory, a person devises his
strategy according to his initially perceived position in
relation to the other participants. On the other hand, a
person’s strategy according to minimum power theory is based
upon his rational analysis of the final outcome of the situation.
Mention should also be given to a third explanation of
coalition formation, that of anticompetitive theory
. As
previously stated, this is actually a post hoc theory advanced
by Qamson (196^) and based on an extensive series of experi-
ments performed by Vlnacke and colleeigues. To the writer's
knowledge, Vlnacke has never conceptualized his results
under the rubric of this theory. However, he has discussed
at length the anticompetitive strategy which his female
subjects frequently used.
Anticompetitive theory emphasizes the minimization of
disruptive aspects of bargaining. Participants avoid dealing
with persons who are highly competitive and skillful in
bargaining. Coalitions are predicted to fonii between partici-
pants for whom minimal resistance is expected, e.g,, persons
who are equal in resources or pivotal power. Gamson (196^)
distinguishes this theory from minimum resource and power
theories in the following manner;
If players in minimum power theory are trying to
get as much as they can and players in minimum resource
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trying to get as much as they deserve,pliers in anticompetitive theory are focused on main-talning the social relationships in the group. An
anticompetitive norm exists, the theory suggests,
against efforts to strike the most advantageous dealpossible. Coalitions will form along the lines ofleast resistance (p. 90),
The basis for the derivation of anticompetitive theory
is in Vlnacke's finding that females in his experiments gen-
erally tried to transform the mixed-motive situation into a
pure coordination situation. This strategy was labeled by
Vlnacke as "accommodative." The participants’ behaviors
wore oriented toward the social relationships of the situation,
"toward the end of arriving at an equitable or ’fair’ out-
come of maximum satisfaction (or at least Justice) to all
concerned" (Bond & Vlnacke, 196I, pp. 71-72), For example,
rotation systems were devised to equalize the payoffs and,
if permitted, alliances were formed which Included every
participant. In contrast to the concepts of parity nom and
pivotal power discussed earlier, it is suggested that an
equal!zinp; norm accounts for accommodative behavior. An
equalizing norm asserts that everyone is equal in the situ-
ation regardless of his Investments. Unequal resources and
pivotal powers are threatening to the social cohesiveness of
the group. Therefore, Inequalities are minimized and pro-
raotlve interdependencies are encouraged.
Vlnacke contrasts accommodative strategy with exploitative
strategy, typically masculine. Though Qamson (196^) alludes
to this distinction, he neither differentiates exploitative
strategy from other strategies nor does he Incorporate it with
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minimum resource or power theories. If accommodative behavior
is anticompetitive, then exploitative behavior is clearly
competitive. Participants are strongly oriented toward maxi-
mizing their own share of the rewards and toward obtaining
all that they can for themselves. It is suggested that
exploitative strategy need not be explained by a fourth
theory. It clearly 1s not a cooperative orientation (anti-
competitive theory) nor does it seem to be oriented toward
getting what one deserves (minimum resource theory), but is
rather a bargaining orientation designed to get as much as
possible for oneself (minimum power theory). By definition,
exploitative behavior is not the taking of that to which one
is entitled but the taking of all that one can get. At
present, then, minimum power theory seems to encompass the
type of strategy which Vinacke called exploitative. It is
not clear, however, whether or not the strategy implies a
rational analysis of the final outcomes of the situation.
Three theories of coalition formation have been reviewed
and contrasted in this section. All are similar in that they
are derived from a power or influence base. They differ in
their conceptualization of this base. For one theory the
initial distribution of resources determines the power re-
lationships, for another theory the frequency with which these
resources can be put to profitable use (l.e., pivotal power)
determines the power structiire, and for a third theory
the
interpersonal social relationships of the gTOup members
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estabUahes a norm determlnlns alllanoes. New evidence for
these theories will be presented In Chapter V and discussed
in Chapter VI.
Hesearoh
Several different types of mixed
-motive situations have
t t
been employed in the Investigation of coalition formation vari-
ables: competitive board games similar to Parchesl (Amldjaja
ft Vlnaoke, I965J Bond ft Vinacke, 196I; Chaney ft Vlnacke, 196O;
Kelley ft Arrowood, I960; Stryker ft Psathas, 196O; Vlnacke,
1959; Vlnaoke, 196i*b; Vlnacke ft Arkoff, 1957; Vlnacke, Crowell,
Dlen, ft Young, 19665 Vlnacke ft Qulllckson, 1964; Vlnacke,
Ragusa, ft Crowell, 196^5 Willis, 1962), quiz games (Uesugl ft
Vlnacke, 1963; Vlnacke, Ragusa, ft Crowell, 1964; Vlnacke ft
Stanley, I962), multiplication and matching games (Vlnacke,
1964a), a political convention game (Burris ft Frye, 19665
Qamson, 1961b), and a payoff matrix game (Lleberman, 1962).
The competitive board game is illustrative of a typical
experimental situation. Each S is randomly assigned a given
amount of resources prior to each game. These resources are
often in the form of weights, l.e., 4, 3, 2, or 1. During
the game all players move simultaneous ly each time a die is
thrown, moving the distance equal to their weights times the
value of the die. The game is terminated when one player or
a combination of players reaches ’‘home” or the players agree
on who is the winner. Clearly, the larger the amount of a
person's (or team's) resources the greater is the probability
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of winning the game* At any time during the gEune any player
may form a coalition with any other player, in this event,
the partners or allies pool their resources and play the re-
mainder of the game according to their combined resources
times the value of the die thrown. Once a coalition is
formed in a particular game and a division of the payoff de-
cided upon, the agreement is considered permanent for that game.
Studies of coalition formation have dealt predominately
with three-person groups, although four-person g3x>ups (Willis,
1962) and five-person groups (Oamson, 1961b) are represented
in the literature. Attention has been focused on the types
of strategy associated with various distributions of resources
among players, situational factors, and group composition.
More specifically, independent variables manipulated have been:
amount and distribution of resources (e.g,, 3-2-2, 4-3-2,
4-2-1, 1-1-1, ••.)> (same-sex, mixed-sex), experimental
games (board vs. quiz, multiplication vs. matching), incentive
conditions (game-by-game, cumulative score, delayed payoff,
immediate payoff), ages (7-8* l4-l6, college), motivations
(achievement, nurturance), information concerning strategies
(1, 2, or 3 members informed), emd values of payoff matrix
(6j^, 8^, 10^). It should be noted that variables of an inter-
personal nature, such as attraction, have not been systemati-
cally manipulated. Dependent variables have been, for the
most part, frequency of coalitions formed, proportion of pay-
off agreed upon or"deals made," and initiation and
reception
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of offers to ally — bargaining behavior.
Several general conclusions from the preceding research
are relevant to the present study. Some ooncluslona result
from consistent findings of numerous studies, while others
remain more tenuous. Vinacke and colleagues have repeatedly
found that the two players of a triad possessing the least
amount of resources form a coalition agad.nst the third player
who possesses the greatest amount of resources. However, the
coalitions were primarily formed when it was possible for the
two "wealcer” members to win by allying (e.g,, 3-2-2, 4-3-2).
Few coalitions were formed when one member possessed a major-
ity of the resources or was all-powerful (e.g., 3-1-1# 4-2-1).
‘’The weakest member of the triad Is in the most favored position
when it comes to Joining pair coalitions” (Kelley & Arrowood,
i960, p. 243). These results wei*e supportive of minimum
resource theory (Caplow, 195^# 1959# Chertkoff, 19^7# damson,
1961a, 1964). The findings indicated that outcomes were de-
termined by the players' perceptions of their relative strengths
at the outset of a game. Initiation of offers to allj^ generally
conformed to the distribution of resources at the beginning
of the game. Players who perceived themselves as weak initiated
offers to ally significantly more often than players not per-
ceiving themselves as weak. The players also demanded a
share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources
which they had contributed to the coalition (Oainson,
1961b).
3^
The strong empirical evidence for minimum resource theory
was evidence against minimum power theory. Where resources
were distributed In a 3-2-2 or ^-3-2 fashion, a rational
analysis of the situation should have led the participants
to conclude that each player, In terms of final outcome, was
equal to the other two. Few, If any, experiments demonstrated
that such a rational analysis was operative during the coali-
tion situation. Kelley and Arrowood (i960) criticized the
complex procedure used by Vlnacke and Arkoff ( 1957 ). They
hypothesized '’that with a simpler procedure, subjects will
acquire an adequate understanding of the true power relations
and act more In accord with a rational analysis of the situa-
tion than the Vlnacke and Arkoff data would suggest" (Kelley &
Arrowood, i960, p. 233 ). Their results were interpreted as
supportive of their hypothesis. Coalitions were formed more
in keeping with a chance distribution than were those fomed
in Vlnacke and Arkoff 's experiment. However, the frequency
distribution remained favorable to minimum resource theory.
Perhaps the most important finding was that the greater the
number of games played with the same resource distributions,
the more coalitions formed on the basis of chance. That Is,
players learned very rapidly that their powers were equal and
conformed in later games to the expectations of minimum power
theory. Recently, a more direct test of the two theories was
made (Vinacke, Crowell, Dien, & Young, 19^6 ). It was con-
cluded that even though groups were given an extended learning
session and one to three players of each group were informed
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about boi^ strategies, ’’there was little evidence for a signi-
ficant shift to an equal Incidence of the three possible
coalitions (l,e«, weak alliances continued to occur at a
level above-chance under the Information conditions).” The
overall evidence at this time Is more supportive of minimum
resource theory than of minimum power theory.
A third Interpretation of coalition formation discussed
earlier Is anticompetitive theory. The foremost concern Is
with the social relationships among group members. Disruptive
effects upon the group are minimized. In contrast to an
exploitative strategy In which males are oriented toward
winning and strong competitiveness, an accommodative or antl-
competlve strategy, typical of females. Is characterized by
mutually satisfactory arrangements or equitable outcomes
oriented toward the social situation Itself. More specifically,
females (a) more often fall to form coalitions, (b) arrive at
more triple alliances, (c) form more coalitions when none are
necessary, and (d) agree upon more proportionate divisions of
the payoff (Vinacke, 1959) . A comparison of three experimental
games (competitive board, masculine quiz, feminine quiz) re-
sulted In additional evidence for accommodative and exploitative
strategies (Vinacke, Ragusa, & Crowell, 196^). Furthermore,
differences among the experimental games did not alter the
nature of the strategy followed by the sexes (Vinacke &
Stanley, I962). Nor was the strategy changed when mixed-sex
triads were substituted for same-sex triads (Bond & Vinacke,
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1961 ). Even with four Incentive conditions Introduced into
the situation, Vlnacke (1962) concluded that '*the most strik-
ing behavior was associated with differences between exploita-
tive (masculine) and accommodative (feminine) strategy.” At
the present time, only one study has reported finding no sig-
nificant differences between male and female behavior (Burris
& Prye, 1966), It Is concluded, therefore, that the sexes
manifest striking contrasts In their styles of play, l.e.,
in the kinds of coalitions they form and In the payoff they
agree upon.
Of less relevance to the present study are the effects
of differences In age (Vinacke & Oulllckson, 1964 ) and moti-
vational levels (Chaney & Vlnacke, 196O; Amidjaja & Vlnacke,
1965) on coalescing behavior. There Is some evidence for a
developmental change In competitive behavior among males
between the ages of 7-8 and l4 -l6 years. Both males and
females display accommodative behavior during younger ages,
but males shift from accommodative to exploitative behavior
during the early teen-age years. Motivational differences
have also been found among males, but not among females.
Males high In achievement play an active, initiating role in
coalition formation; those high In nurturance play a less
active, recipient role. Thus, motivational differences are
Important for the frequency with which males assert themselves
In the bargaining aspects of the experimental game.
Hypotheses
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The conceptual hypothesis guiding this study Is that
dyads of attracted relationships will be more cooperative
when placed Into a mixed-motive situation than will stranger
dyads of unattracted relationships, but that friend dyads
will be more competitive than acquaintance dyads.
Specific hypotheses of this study are stated according
to the two major Independent variables: attraction and sex.
Predictions for both attraction and sex are made for each of
the three major dependent variables: frequency of coalitions
formed. Initiators and recipients of offers to ally, and
agreed upon divisions of payoff.
Frequency of Coalitions Formed
Attraction , Acquaintance dyads will form coalitions
more frequently than will friend dyads, and both
attracted dyads will coalesce more frequently than
will stranger control dyads.
Sex
.
Male groups will form coalitions more frequently
than will female groups.
Initiators and Recipients of Offers to Ally
Attraction. Acquaintance dyads will initiate and
receive offers to ally more frequently than will
friend dyads, and both attracted dyads will initiate
and receive offers more frequently than will
stranger control dyads.
Male groups will Initiate and receive offers to
more frequently than will female groups.
Dlvislona of Payoff
Attraction. Acquaintance dyads will agree upon
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more proportionate dlvlBlons of payoff than will
friend dyads, and both attracted dyads will agree
upon more proportionate divisions than will
stranger control dyads.
Sex , / Male groups will agree upon less proportionate
divisions of payoffs than will female groups.
*v
I
CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Sub.lects
One hundred and eighty undergraduate students at the
University of Massachusetts participated In the experiment,
Ss were assigned to 60 groups, 30 composed of males and 30
of females.
Design
The experimental design was a two-between and one-wlthln
analysis of variance; the between-group variables were attraction
and sex; the withln-group variable was resources assigned
across twelve experimental games. For each sex, three levels
of attraction were manipulated: strangers, acqualntemces,
and friends. Thus, there were six experimental conditions of
ten triads each.
Stranger groups were composed of three randomly selected
same-sex students. The only restriction was that they had
not chosen each other- on a "Student Questionnaire" to be
explained below. Acquaintance and friend groups were com-
posed of two acquaintances, or of two friends, and a stranger.
In all groups, attracted dyads had Indicated reciprocal
soclonetrlc choices. A stranger was randomly assigned as
the third person for each attracted dyad, with the restrictions
th&t h© b© of th© saine sex and bhab h© had chosen neither
dyad meiiiber nor had been chosen by them.
During the first week of the Spring semester, 1966, a
”Student Questionnaire" (see Appendix) was administered to
all students in two different undergraduate psychology
classes. From this pool of approximately 590 Ss, 20 acquaint-
ance dyads were selected (10 male, 10 female) and 20 friend
dyads. Acquaintance dyads were mutual choices of persons
who were "just beginning to associate with each other and who
hoped to become better acquainted." Friend dyads were mutual
choices of "roommates, sorority sisters, fraternity brothers,
etc., who had known each other for one year or longer and
who frequently participated In social situations together,"
Roommates were selected whenever possible,
A post-experimental measure of these manipulations was
taken. Six groups were replaced because of changes In re-
lationships occurring during the two-month Interval between
Ss* sociometric choices and the experimental situation; either
an attracted dyad member and the stranger had begun to form
a relationship, or the degree of attraction between dyad
members had changed.
Dependent variables were frequency of coalitions formed.
Initiators and recipients of offers to ally, and agreed
upon divisions of payoff.
Experimental Qame
A simple Intra-group competitive board game was used.
A board was constructed, similar to one used by Vlnacke and
In games like Parchesl, with 103 spaces, the last space being
the "goal," Every fifth space was numbered. The objective
of the game was to be the first to move from "start" to
"goal," The power relationship used was one In which A >
B > C, where A< (B + C). Resources were assigned weights
of 3 and 2. After every throw of a single die by ^ each
player moved a number of spaces equal to his assigned weight
times the number of pips shown on the die. Therefore, If
the value of the die was 5» one player advanced 20 spaces,
the second 15 spapes, and the third 10 spaces. All players
moved simultaneously. After the first throw of a game, any
player could offer to ally with any other player. If the
offer were turned down or an agreement could not be reached
concerning the division of the payoff, the game continued with
each S playing Independently. Further offers by any player
could be made during the course of the game. Hov;ever, if an
offer were accepted and the players agreed on the division
of a 100 point payoff, they pooled their resources and pro-
ceeded to a position on the board equal to their combined
spaces. For the remainder of the game the allies moved forward
according to their combined resources times the throw of the
die. Once an alliance was formed. It was permanent for that
game, A player was permitted to concede defeat whenever his
^2
position appeared hopeless. Each game terminated, then,
either when one player or a coalition of players reached the
"goal," or when the group agreed upon a winner (s).
Procedure and Instructions
were seated randomly In one of three semi-circle
positions around the game board, E was directly opposite the
Ss. A stand on the table In front of each contained a
signal button and an upright Information plaque. The button
was depressed by S whenever he wished to bargain with another
player. This signal activated one of three lights on E’s
control panel enabling E to keep an accurate record of
Initiators and recipients and to determine which S initiated
first In the event of nearly simultaneous signals. The
plaque was mounted on the front of the stand shielding each
S^*s hand from view of the other players. Attached to the
front of the plaques were Ss' first names. A clip on the top
of the plaque held each player's assigned weight for a parti-
cular game. The Information of each plaque was clearly
visible to all Ss.
Prior to each of 12 games, E assigned weights of 3>
and 2 to the players. Ten random sequences were generated,
one for each of the 10 groups In an experimental condition.
A restriction was placed upon the randomization procedure so
that all players received each weight four times during the
course of the experiment. Thus, each attracted dyad was
assigned equally often to the three basic resource
combinations
^3
^-3, ^-2, and 3-2.
SB were Instructed that E would keep a cumulative score
during the series of g£unes and that the results would be an-
nounced at the conclusion of the experiment. Ss did not know
how many games were to be played; this was to minimize attempts
to ’’speculate" on the weight assignments and to reduce the
possibility of mutual agreements regarding future games.
The purpose of the cumulative score was motivational. It
provided an Incentive
^
for evei^ 100 points accumulated
during the experiment was worth 25 cents. Thus, $3.00 was
divided among the members of each group.
The following Instructions were read to every group;
each player was given a copy to read and consult during the
games If needed.
This game Is a contest between three players. The
objective Is to reach the "goal" first. Before every
game each pleiyer will be assigned a number representing
his strength for that game. You will move by multi-
plying your assigned number times the value of a die,
. thrown by the experimenter. For example. If you are
assigned a number of "2" and the die comes up "3">
you will move six spaces on the game board, 100 points
will be given to the winner or winners of each game.
At the end of the experiment the points from all games
will be totaled. Each player will receive in cash 1
cent for every k points that he accumulates^ *Jhus, 20
points are worth 5^, 100 points 2^, etc.
After the die hits the table on the first throw of
a game, any player may foi*m an alliance with any other
player. In this event, players entering Into alliance
must decide upon how they will divide the 100 points.
If a player wins by himself he receives all 100 points.
If he Is a member of a winning alliance, he divides the
100 points with his ally. After forming an alliance,
players join forces and proceed to the position on the
board represented by their combined acquired spaces;
thereafter, they move according to their combined
assigned numbers. In other words^ the two players
Join as If they were one player, with one position on
the board and one combined number. Once an alliance
Is formed. It Is permanent for that game and that game
only. Triple alliances are not allowed.
To form an alliance, a player signals the experimenter
by pressing the button In front of him. He then names
the player with whom he wishes to talk. These two
players have a maximum of 1^ minute to decide If they
want to ally, and how they are going to divide the 100
points between them. If either desires to explore the
possibility of forming an alliance with the third
player, he may terminate the discussion he Is having
by pressing his button and naming the other player.
The player not Included In a discussion is not allowed
to Interrupt during the 1 minute time limit. However,
he may Initiate an alliance If the other players reach
a stalemate In their discussion or If the discussion
time runs out.
Any player may concede defeat If he (she) considers
his (her) position to be hopeless at any point during
any game.
After these instructions were read, E Illustrated the game
In the following manner.
Okay, let me show you an example of how the game Is
played. If there are any questions, please feel free
to ask them. First, everyone place their markers on
"start.” The numbers that will be assigned during
the experiment are 4, 3> s-nd 2. Let's say, for example,
that Red Is Blue Is 3, and Yellow Is 2. I throw the
die and It comes up . . . Each player moves by multi-
plying his number times the number of pips on the die.
In this case Red (4) would move to Blue (3) to ,
and Yellow (2) to . I throw the die again and It
comes up
.
(markers moved a second time) The
same procedure Is followed for each throw of the die.
Now, if Red and Blue should form an alliance, they
would add their spaces together, which would be .
From then on their combined number is 7. li* Blue and
Yellow formed an alliance they would advance to
and play from then on with the combined n^er of
Similarly, If Red and Yellow formed an alliance they
would advance to and play from it is
combined number oTT, If an alliance is formed I
permanent for that game. In the next game,
however.
^5
everyone begins again from start — no alliances carry
over from g€Lme to game.
An alliance may be initiated by any player after the
die has hit the table on the first throw of a game, A
player simply presses his button to signal me that he
wishes to discuss a possible alliance with another
player. If these two players decide to ally, they
must decide how they are going to divide the 100
points. If they decide not to ally or an agreement
i*eached, either one may signal to talk with
the third player if he so desires. Although he is
not allowed to Interrupt, the third player may initiate
an alliance if the other two do not come to an agree-
ment in 1 minute
,
Each game has 100 points , to be given to the' winner
or winners. The points won by each player will be
totaled at the end of the experiment. Each will re-
ceive in cash 1 cent for every four points that he
accumulates,
E asked if there were any questions and paraphrased the
appropriate instruction if any were asked. Weights for the
i
*
first game were assigned and an explanation given of how to
display them on the plaque. The first game was begun.
CHAPTER V
RESULTS
The results of this study are presented In three sections
according to the dependent variables; frequency of coalitions
formed. Initiators and recipients of offers to ally, and
divisions of payoff. Within each section findings relevant
to the attraction and sex hypotheses are given as well as
data supportive" of the coalition theories. It should be
noted that data within each section are first presented for
groups, then for dyads.
Frequency of Coalitions Formed
The results reported in this chapter are generally
based on coalitions actually formed. There were 720 possible
coalitions (60 groups times 12 games each). However, In 52
games no coalitions were formed. Thus the analyses were
performed upon 668 coalitions; the mean number of coalitions
per group was 11.13.
Scores for each group were the frequencies of coalescing
In the three possible resource combinations: 't-S.
^-2, and
3-2. Mean frequency of coalitions formed by groups
and by
resource combinations Is given In Table 1. The first
cell
of this table represents the mean number of
times the 20
groups including friend dyads formed U-3
coalitions.
TABI£ 1
Mean Frequency of Coalitions Formed by
Groups and by Resource Combinations
^7
Groups
Resource Combinations Group
Means^-3 4-2 3-2
Friends 3.85 3.20 4.30 3.78
Acquaintances 2.30 4.15 4.55 3.67
Strangers 2.45 3.00 5.60 3.68
Resource Means 2.87 3.45 4.82 3.71
TABLE 2
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Groups of Coalitions
Formed by Sex» Attraction « and Resources
Source SS df MS P
Between Groups
Sex (S) 6.42 1 6.42 6.11*
Attraction (A) .24 2 .24
S X A .68 2 .34
0/SA 56.73 54 1.05
Within Groups
Resources (R) 120.21 2 60.11 10.23
S X R 4.74 2 2.37 M
A X R 62.89 4 15.72 2.67
S X A X R 41.96 4 10.49 1.78
GR/SA 634.87 108 5.86
*P< .05
**P< .01
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If groups In all experimental conditions had formed all
resource combinations equally often, each cell mean would be
3»71^ l,e., one-third of the 11,13 coalitions formed per
group. Table 2 Is a summary of the analysis of variance for
groups
.
The main effect of Attraction was not significant and
simply shows that coalitions, regardless of the resource
combinations, were formed equally often In all groups. It Is
not a test of varying degrees of dyadic attraction, for each
group not only Includes the frequency of attracted dyad
coalitions, but also those coalitions formed between members
of the dyad and the stranger. The main effect of Resources
was significant (P =* 10.23, df 2/l08, p< .01), Coalitions
were formed as predicted by minimum resource theory: 3-2 >
4-2 > 4-3, A significant Attraction by Resource Interaction
was also obtained (F « 2.67, df 4/108, p< .05). V/hen all
members of the group were strangers, the preponderance of
coalitions were of a 3-2 nature. In groups where two of the
three participants had prior dyadic experience, the Incidence
of 3-2 alliances was much less frequent. Groups including
friends formed a large number of 4-3 coalitions, while those
Including acquaintances allied very frequently In the 4-2
combination. The latter finding suggests that acquaintance
groups were oriented toward maximizing their Individual gains.
Later In this section, the frequency of coalescing for acquaint-
ance dyads alone will be presented. Will these dyads. In
fact,
be more competitive than friend dyads?
i*9
Table 2 also shows a significant main effect of Sex
(P =« 6,11, df 1/54, p< .05). As predicted, the mean frequency
of coalition formation for Males (3.90) differed significantly
from the mean frequency for Females (3.52). Of the 52 games
In which no coalitions were formed, ^3 (835^) were In female
groups. Seventeen of the 30 female groups (575^) failed to
form a coalition during one or more games. However, only 8
male groups (27^) failed to coalesce during every game, with
7 of the 8 forming no alliances during Just one of the 12
games. It was noted earlier that non-coalescing Is considered
one form of accommodative behavior. As In previous research,
females allied less frequently than did males. The nonsigni-
ficant interactions with sex reveal that the behavior of
males and females did not differ in the various attraction
and resource conditions. Their behavior differed only In
the frequency of their coalescing.
As an additional test of minimum power and minimum
resource theories, an analysis was performed on the frequency
with which each resource combination was fomed across the
twelve games. The analysis Included all coalitions formed on
a particular game. If, as Kelley and Arrowood (i960) sug-
gested, subjects acquire an understanding of the true power
relations with repeated experience In the experimental game,
then the frequency of coalition formation should approximate
a chance distribution as more and more games are played.
From the first through the twelfth game there was not
a
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significant change In the frequency of occurrence of the
three possible coalitions (P * 1,17). However, there was a
trend toward a more rational analysis of the situation as
predicted by minimum power theory. Figure 1 plots percentage
of coalitions formed for each resource combination against
four blocks of three games each. Percentages are based only
on coalitions actually formed. The percentage of 3-2 alliances
was particularly high during the first block of games. Across
games, 4-2 alliances Increased until their occurrence was
Identical with 3-2 coalitions during the last block of games.
Finally, the frequency of 4-3 coalitions remained relatively
stable throughout the entire sequence of games. Repeated
experience with the same weight assignments (4-3-2) resulted
In a trend toward a more chance distribution of alliances.
Thus, some support was obtained for Kelley and Arrowood's
(i960) finding "that after the first three or four trials
there Is little more than chance exclusion of 4 from coalitions."
Table 3 presents the mean frequency of obtained and
expected coalitions formed by dyads and by resource combinations.
The means of this table are based only on friend dyads, acquaint-
ance dyads, or stranger control dyads; that Is, on Just one of
the three possible dyads represented In the group analyses.
The stranger dyads were one randomly selected pair of players
from each group of three strangers. Scores are contingent
on both the degree of dyadic attraction and resource
combina-
tion. Thus, the mean frequency of obtained coalitions
given
PERCENTAGE
OF
COALITIONS
FORMED
Figure 1* Percentage of coalitions formed by
groups for each resource combination across blocks
of games.
TABLE 3
Mean Frequency of Obtained (and Expected) Coalitions
Formed by I^ade and by Resource Combinations
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Dyads
Resource Combinations Dyad
4-2 3-2 Means
Friends
>
1.60
(1.28)
1.65
( 1 .07 )
2.00
(l.'tS)
1;75
Acquaintances .85
( . 77 )
1.15
(1.38)
ll 55
^
( 1 . 52 )
1.18
Strangers .80
( .82)
.85
( ; 98)
1.90
(1.85)
1.18
Resource Means 1.08 1.22 1.82 1.37
TABLE 4
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Dyads of Coalitions
Formed by Sex, Attraction, and Resources
Source SS df MS F
Between Dyads
Sex (S) .14 1 .14
Attraction (A) 12.84 2 6.42 7.50**
S X A .18 2 .09
D/SA 46.23 5^ .86
Within Dyads
Resources (R) 18.31 2 9.16 7.34
•
S X R 2.71 2 1.36 1.09
A X R 3.96 4 .99
S X A X R 3.02 4 .76
DR/SA 134.67 108 1.25
**p< .01
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In the first cell of Table 3 (l.6o) represents the mean
frequency of Friend-Friend alliances when ^-3 coalitions
were actually formed. Mean frequencies of expected coalitions,
given In parentheses, were derived from the group data of
Table 1. For example, for friend groups which coalesced
an average of 3.85 times In the ^-3 resource combination. It
may be assumed that the two friends allied one-third of the
time and that each friend allied with the stranger one-third
of the time. The expected frequency of an alliance between
any pair, then. Is 3*85 divided by 3 or 1,28, In Table 3,
contrasts can be made between obtained mean frequencies and
expected mean frequencies for all dyads. It should be noted
that friend dyads consistently formed more coalitions than
expected while the alliances of acquaintance and stranger
dyads did not differ from the expected frequencies. Table 4
summarizes the analysis of variances for coalitions formed
by dyads.
Dyads of varying attraction differed significantly In
their frequency of allying (F « 7.50, df 2/54, p< .01),
Friend dyads allied more frequently than acquaintance or
stranger dyads regardless of the resources assigned to them.
Moreover, acquaintances and strangers did not differ from
each other In their overall mean frequency of allying. The
effect of dyadic attraction upon coalitions formed is seen
more distinctly In Figure 2; mean frequency of coalitions
formed Is plotted against resource combinations. As
predicted
MEAN
FREQUENCY
OF
COALITIONS
FORMED
5^
RESOURCE COMBINATIONS
Figure 2. Mean frequency of dyad formation
when dyad possessed resource combinations of ^-3^
4-2, and 3-2.
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friend dyads formed more coalitions than stranger control
dyads. However, contrary to expectations, acquaintance
dyads did not coalesce more frequently than friend or
stranger control dyads. Thus, the attraction hypothesis was
only partially supported. The predicted rivalry between
friends as opposed to cooperation between acquaintances was
not found. Rather, friend dyads played to maximize their
Joint outcomes while acquaintance and stranger dyads generally
played to maximize their Individual outcomes. Therefore, the
previous question Is answered In the affirmative: acquaintance
dyads were more competitive than friend dyads.
Table h also shows that frequency of coalition formation
was a function of the Resources assigned to the dyads (P =»
7.34, df 2/108, p< .01). The 3-2 resource combination led
significantly more often to a coalition than did the 4-2 or
4-3 combinations. The mean frequencies plotted In Figure 2
also show that for all dyads, 3-2 was more frequently formed
than 4-2 or 4-3. This finding again supports a minimum
resource Interpretation cf coalition formation. Coalitions
were formed In which the dyads* resources were as small as
possible while still being sufficient to control the outcome.
Although the trend was for 3-2 > 4-2 > 4-3 In all groups and
dyads, differences were particularly prominent for
strangers.
Resource combinations differed less for attracted
groups and
dyads. In fact, friends coalesced almost equally
In all re-
source combinations. Therefore, whether groups
or dyads were
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considered, the effect of prior dyadic experience was to de-
crease the frequency of coalitions formed according to a
minimum resource strategy. The greater the degree of attraction,
the less minimum resource theory predicted coalescing behavior.
Initiators and Recipients of Offers to Ally
The analyses In this section will only be concerned with
successful initiations of offers to ally. Only 7.55^ of
first Initiation offers were unsuccessful; 9 ,0% of all offers
were unsuccessful, 5.85^ by males and 3.2$^ by females. Thus,
unsuccessful attempts to allj^ were very Infrequent.
Scores for each group were frequencies of Initiating or
receiving offers to ally by the three resource assignments:
4, 3^ and 2, Mean frequency of offers Initiated and received
by groups and by resource assignments Is given In Table 5.
The first cell of this table represents the mean number of
times the 20 groups Including friend dyads Initiated offers
when assigned a resource of M. It should be noted that the
group means are Identical with those of Table 1. Since only
successful Initiation attempts were analyzed, all successful
Initiations, by definition, resulted in coalitions. It is
further* noted that In the summary of the analysis of variance
presented In Table 6, the between-groups effects are the same
as those In Table 2. Again, offers to ally were initiated
and received equally often In all groups. And, as before,
males were the Initiators and recipients of successful
offers
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TABLE 5
Mean Frequency of Initiators and Recipients
by Groups and by Resource Assignments
Groups
Initiators Recipients Group43 2 432 Means
Friends 3.65 4.15 3.55 3.30 4.10 3.95 3.78
Acquaintances 3.75 2.80 4.45 2.70 4.05 4.25 3.67
Strangers 3.85 3.75 3.45 . 1.60 4.35 5.10 3.68
Resource Means 3.75 3.57 3.82 2.53 4.17 4.43 3.71
TABLE 6
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Groups for Initiators
and Recipients by Sex, Attraction, and Resources
Source df
Initiator Recipient
MS F MS P
Between Groups
Sex (S) 1 6.42 6.11* 6.42 6.11*
Attraction (A) 2 .24 OJ•
S X A 2 .34 .34
G/SA 54 1.05 1.05
Within Groups
Resources (R) 2 1.01 63.49 8.53**
S X R 2 8.61 1.56 19.29 2.59
A X R 4 7.82 1.42 11.13 1.50
S X A X R 4 .47 9.18 1.23
GR/SA 108
1.
5.52 1 7.44
*P< .05
**p<
.01
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to ally significantly more often than were females.
As Initiators
, 3# and 2 did not differ significantly
in the frequency with which they offered to form coalitions.
Minimum power theory predicts that all players should Initiate
with equal frequency since all players are equal In pivotal
power. However, support for this theory must be qualified.
Although ^ Initiated offers to ally as frequently as 3 and 2
In all games, initiated only 21% of the alliances during
the first three games, the second and third blocks of
games 4 was Initiating slightly above a chance level (36%),
and by the final three games 4's percentage had risen above
chance to 4l%. Thus, a significant change was found across
games In the frequency of Initiations by 4, 3, and 2 (F «
2.75> df 11/543, p< .01). As a greater number of games were
played, 4 Increased his Initiation offers while 2's decreased.
The data showed that support for minimum power theory was not
obtained until approximately the fifth game. During the first
block of games, players with the smallest assigned weights
were the most frequent Initiators as expected by minimum
resource theorists.
Table 6 also shows that recipients of offers to ally
differed significantly (P «* 8.53> df 2/108, p< .01). The
player assigned a weight of 2 received more Initiation offers
than those assigned weights of 3 or 4. There was also a
nonsignificant trend for 2 to receive more offers as games
progressed (P - 1.57). It was noted above, however, that 2
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Initiated less frequently across games. Therefore, his
Increased frequency as a recipient over games must be inter-
preted viith caution. Minimum povter theoi^y predicts that the
possessor of each resource assignment should receive an equal
number of offers to ally since each can equally change a
losing coalition into a winning one. On the other hand,
minimum resource theory predicts that in order to maximize
his payoff, a player should possess resources in excess of
his ally *8, The greater his resources relative to his ally*s,
the greater the share of the payoff he can demand according
to the parity norm. Therefore, the player possessing a
resource of 2 should be the recipient of the most offers,
as he was in the above findings. He not only changes a
losing coalition into a winning one, but may also provide
the initiator with the greater proportion of the payoff.
The exchange between initiator and recipient can be
examined according to the resources assigned to each. For
example, when 3 initiated, was his offer more frequently made
to -4 or to 2? According to minimum power theory, it is ex-
pected that ^ and 2 will each receive one-half of 3's initiations.
However, this was not the case as shown in Table 7. The
total percentage of offers initiated by 3 was .32: .11 to 4
and .21 to 2 (F « 10.39> df 1/54, P< .01), Initiations
from 2 to 3 occurred significantly more frequently than from
2 to 4 (F * 12,94, df 1/54, P< .01). Finally, Initiations
from 4 to 2 were more frequent than from 4 to 3, but the
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difference only approached etatlstlcal slenlflcance (p -
2*89, df 1/5^, ,10 >p.)> ,05 ). Thus, the data clearly Indi-
cate a preference for an alliance with a player who possessed
a smaller resource than one’s own, or, in the case of 2
,
with
a player most nearly like oneself.
TABLE 7
Percentage of Offers to Ally for Groups from Initiator
to Recipient by Resource Assignments
Initiator
Recipient
Total432
.15 .19 .3^
3 .11 - - .21 .32
2 .12 .22 - - .3^
Total .23 .37 .to 1.00
Flgoire 3 shows percentage of offers to ally from Initiator
to recipient across blocks of games. Segments of the figure
from left to right are initiations by 4, 3 , and 2. It can
be seen that the increase of 4*s initiations across games
were directed to 2, not to 3. Conversely, 2*s increased
frequency of receiving offers was primarily due to 4's more
frequent initiations; 3 not only received fewer offers, but
continued to initiate at a relatively stable frequency.
Table 8 presents the mean frequency of obtained and ex-
pected offers to ally by dyads and by resource assignments.
6l
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Mean Frequency of Obtained (and Expected) Initiators and
Recipients by Pyads and by Resource Assignments
T^rn/1 a
Initiators Recipients 1 I^ad
4 3 2 ^32 Means
Friends
Acquaintances
1.65 1.85 1,75
(1.22) (1.38) (i.is;
1.15 1.00 1.40
( 1 . 25 ) ( . 93 )
(
1 . 48
;
1.60 1.75 1.90
( 1 . 10 )( 1 . 37 )( 1 . 32 )
,
.85 1.40 1.30
( . 90 )( 1 . 35)( 1 . 42 )
1.75
1.18
Strangers
.95 1.55 1.05
( 1 . 28)( 1 . 25)( 1 . 15 )
.70 1.15 1.70
( . 53)( 1 . 45)( 1 . 70 )
1.18
Resource Means 1.25 1.47 l.^K) 1.05 1.63 1.37
TABLE 9
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Dyads of Initiators
and Recipients by Sex, Attraction, and Resources
— T
Source
—
df
Initiator 1 Recipient
MS F
1
MS F
Between Pyads
i
Sex (S) 1 .14 .14
Attraction (A) 2 6.42 7.50** 6.42 7.50
S X A 2 •0 VO .09
D/SA 5^ .86 .86
Within Pyads
Resources (R) 2 .74 5.27 2.59
S X R 2 CO• 3.07 1.51
A X R 4 1.17 .96
i
S X A X R h .29 .67
DR/SA 108 1.26 2.03)
P< .01
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Scores are again contingent upon the degree of dyadic attract-
ion and the resource assignment. For example, the first cell
(1,65) represents the mean frequency with which one friend
Initiated to the other friend when either was assigned a
resource of 4, Expected mean frequencies, derived from the
group data of Table 5# are also given. Table 9 summarizes
the analysis of variance for Initiators and recipients by dyads,
TOie group mean of Table 8 and the between-dyads analysis
of Table 9 are Identical with their counterparts In Tables
3 and 4, Friends initiated to and received offers from each
other more frequently than did acquaintances or strangers.
There was no difference for dyads among 4, 3, and 2 In their
frequency of Initiations, In friend and stranger dyauis, 3
initiated the most frequently, but for acquaintance dyads 2
was the most frequent initiator. Although 2 consistently re-
ceived more offers than 3> both more than 4, the resource
assignments did not differ significantly from each other.
Divisions of Payoff
Payoffs were c<xaputed by averaging each groups' division
of the 100 points which were awarded to the winning alliance
of each game, !Hiub, the raw scores for each group v^ere means
based only on games In which coalitions were formed. An
analysis of variance with unequal cell frequencies was per-
formed to adjust for those groups who did not divide the
payoff in each of the three resource combinations.
There is
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a slight bias In the analysis of variance because weighted
means rather than simple means were used. Statistically,
however, there Is very little difference In the obtained
results.
Mean division of payoff by groups and by resource com-
binations Is given in Table 10, The cells of this table
represent a weighted average based on the total sura of indi-
vidual group means divided by the total number of group means.
For example, if the division of a particular game was 55-45,
only the 55 was used In computing the mean. Table 11 Is a
summary of the analysis of variance for groups.
Groups did not differ in their mean divisions of payoff.
Nor was there support for the hypothesis that male groups
would agree upon less proportionate divisions of payoffs
than would female groups. Males' average division was 57 *01
smd females ' 57.53.
The 4-2 resource combination differed significantly from
4-3 and 3-2 (F * 33. df* 2/9^, p< .01), Further analyses
on the resource mean divisions in Table 10 show that payoffs
were divided according to the parity norm belief — an individ-
ual o\aght to get from an agreement an amount proportionate to
what he brought into It. The expected mean divisions based
on the noimi are 67.00 (4-2), 60,00 (3“‘2)> and 57.00 (4-3).
The observed mean divisions were not significantly different
from the expected divisions: 6l,ll (4-2), 55.22 (3-2),
and
55.49 ( 4 -3 ). However, the observed mean
divisions did differ
TABLE 10
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Mean Division of Payoff by Groups
and by Resource Combinations
Groups
Resource Combinations Group
Means^^-3 ^-2 3-2
Friends 55.45 58.89 55.39 56.66
Acquaintances 57.26 62.35 54.53 58.07
Strangers 53.86 62.^42 55.71 57.08
•
Resource Means^
. 55.49 6l.ll . 55.22 57.27
.
^Group and resource means are not a simple average of
row and column cell means. They are a weighted average based
on the total sum of Individual group means divided by the
total number of group means.
TABLE 11
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Groups of Division
of Payoff by Sex, Attraction, and Resources
Source SS df MS F
Between Groups
Sex (S) .09 1 .09
Attraction (A) 125.66 2 62.83
S X A 42.59 2 . 21.29
G/SA 3786.98
.
53 71.45
Within Groups
Resources (R) 910.OM 2 455.02 33.11
S X R .21 2 .10
2.14
A X R 117.84 4 29.46
S X A X R 185.68 46,42 3.38
GR/SA 1291.86 9^ 13.74
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slgnlfloontly from 50,00, the mean division predicted by
minimum power theory. When the overall mean division (57,27)
was tested against an expected mean division of 50,00, a
significant difference was obtained (P « 120.99, df lA64,
P< .01).
Figure plots mean division of payoff for each resource
combination against four blocks of three games each. There
was no significant change In the mean divisions of payoff
for the three combinations across games (P - .56). According
to minimum power theory, one would expect a significant trend
toward more equal divisions; l.e., toward 50. A slightly
decreasing trend was observed for 3-2 and 4-3 combinations,
but 4-2 Increased somewhat. Triad members tended to stabilize
their behavior with repeated experience In the experimental
game.
Table 12 presents the mean division of payoff by dyads
within each resource combination. As In Table 10, the cells
represent a weighted average based on the total sum of each
dyad mean divided by the total member of dyad means. Table
13 summarizes the analysis of variance for dyads.
The main effect of Attraction was not significant.
Friend dyads divided the payoff more proportionately than
stranger control dyads, but contrary to the hypothesis,
acquaintance dyads had the most overall disproportionate
divisions of all dyads. Figure 5 Plots mean division of
dyad payoff against resource combinations. The
curves for
MEAN
DIVISION
OF
PAYOFF
6?
BLOCKS OF THREE GAMES
Figure 4. Mean division of payoff by groups
for each resource combination across blocks of games.
TABUE 12
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Mean Division of Payoff by Dyads
and by Resource Combinations
Dyads
Resource Combinations
Dyad
Means®^-3 A-2 3-2
Friends 55.33 58.39 55.18 56. ^*2
Acquaintances 57.92 63.63 57.35 59.73
Strangers 56.5/1 6HA2 55.6^ 58.58
Resource Means® 56.it9 61,71 56.0^ 58.15
^Dy&A and resource means are not a simple average of
row and column cell means. They are a weighted average based
on the total sum of Individual dyad means divided by the
total number of dyad means.
TABLE 13
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Dyads of Division
of Payoff by Sex, Attraction, and Resources
Source SS df MS F
Between I^ads
Sex (S) 11.06 1 11.06
Attraction (A) 13^.79 2 67. Ao
S X A ^2,26 2 21.13
D/SA 3773.78 53 71.20
Within Dyads
Resources (R) 763.19 2 381.59 13.50
S X R 50.57 2 25.29
A X R 92.50 h 23.13
S X A X R 158.58 4 39.65
1.40
dr/sa 1781.11 63 28.27
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Figure 5. Mean division of dyad payoff when
dyad possessed resource combinations of 4-3^ ^-2,
and 3-2.
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acquaintances and strangers are very similar to each other;
both differ from the curve of the friends.
Division of payoff was a function of the resources
assigned to the dyads (P - 13.50, df 2/63, p< .01). Figure
5 clearly Indicates that the ^4-2 resource combination led to
significantly more disproportionate divisions than did the
3-2 or 4-3 combinations. This result Is In keeping with
the group findings presented earlier and the parity norm
principle of mlnlmisn resource theory. It Is not supportive
of a minimum power explanation. The latter position predicts
that the division of payoff In all resource combinations
would be 50-50, l.e., a horizontal line In Figure 5 at a
mean division of 50.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Numerous questions are raised by the results of the
last chapter. One of the most Important questions Is what
theory of coalition formation. If any, best handles the
empirical data of this study? Are there any general con-
clusions which can be made concerning coalescing behavior
or does most of our knowledge contribute to a sophisticated
"utter confusion theory" described by Gamson (196^1)?
Another important question Is why friends were more cooperative
than acquaintances In this study. In what ways does prior
dyadic experience affect behavior in an experimental game
situation? In the competitive board game used In this study,
how can subjects be motivated to become more involved in the
dynamics of the gemie? The intent of this discussion is to
reflect upon some of these questions and to Integrate the
findings with previous research.
This chapter Is subdivided Into the following areas;
coalition formation theories, dyadic attraction and sex
hypotheses, methodological considerations, and suggestions
for further research. Within the theoretical areas the
discussion will follow the major dependent variables; fre-
quency of coalitions formed. Initiators and recipients of
offers to ally, and divisions of payoff.
Coalition Formation Theories
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Evidence supporting two major coa3.1tlon theories was
obtained In this study. One, minimum resource theory, em-
phasizes the Initial resources (power) which subjects bring
to the experimental situation. Coalitions will form In which
the total resources are as small as possible while still
being sufficient to control the outcome. Adherence to a
parity norm Is predicted; the belief that a person ought to
get from an agreement an amount proportionate to what he
brought Into It. The other, minimum power theory, emphasizes
a rational analysis of the outcomes of the situation. A person’s
pivotal power is the proportion of times his resources can
change a losing coalition Into a winning one. If participants
are equal In pivotal power no one coalition is more likely to
be formed than any other.
The overall frequency with which coalitions were formed
was generally consistent with minimum resource predictions.
For both groups and dyads, the frequency of coalescing was
3«2 > ^-2 y A-3. Moreover, for groups and dyads of strangers
the ratio of 3-2 to i»-2 coalitions was approximately 2:1 as
predicted by Chertkoff (1967). IT data from the fj^ same
of three experiments are pooled (Chertkoff, 1966; Kelley &
Arrowood, I960; Vlnacke & Arkoff, 1957)* a relatively good-
fit is found between Chertkoff *s (1967) minimum resource
predictions and the obtained data. If the data from
game
one of the present study Is subjected to the same test, a
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good
-fit Is also found. The following percentages of coal-
escing are predicted:
.50 (3-2), .25 (^*-2), .00 (A-3), and
•25 (no-coalltlons)
. The obtained percentages were similar:
•37 (3-2), ,17 (^-2), ,13 (^-3), and
.33 (no-coalltlons).
Thus, minimum resource theory predictions account for the
observed frequency of coalescing early in the series of games.
According to minimum resource theory, the ratio of 3-2
to ^-2 coalitions should remain 2:1 across games with the
percentage of no coalitions approaching zero. In this study,
the latter was true but the former was not: no-coalltlons
became very infrequent, but 3-2 and 4-2 alliances converr,ed
over games until they occurred with equal frequency In
Block 4 (cf. Figure 1, p.51).
The convergence of curves as seen in Figure 1 Is pre-
dicted by minimum power theory, l.e., equal Incidence of all
three resource combinations. Kelley and Arrowood's (i960)
resource combinations also tend to converge across games;
however, their number of games — ranging from 10 to 70
with an average of 26 — was considerably greater than In
this study. With regard to frequency of coalition formation,
then, minimum resource theory most accurately predicts
behavior during the first games while minimum power theory
predicts behavior most accurately In later games.
Data from Initiators and recipients of offers to allj^
provided partial support for both theories. With regard to
the Initiators of coalitions. It was found that all players
7^
Initiated with approximately the same frequency. However,
the player assigned a resource of Initiated relatively
Infrequently during the first few games but became very
active during the last games. Theoretically, the Initiator's
behavior early In the experimental session was consistent
with minimum resource predictions, while In the latter
portion of the session his behavior conformed more to minimum
power notions. This significant trend across games reveals
that learning In the experiment was very rapid and that
players became aware of the objective power relationships
early In the sequence of games. Results of recipients of
coalitions clearly supported minimum resource theory. The
player who possessed a resource of 2 was the most frequent
recipient of offers to ally. Perhaps, his low resource
assignment provided the Initiator with the opportunity to
demand the greatest proportion of the payoff. Kelley and
Arrowood (i960) also report that the player with the smallest
amount of resources was the preferred coalition partner.
Minimum resource theory received additional support
from the division of payoff results. The parity norm was
adhered to throughout the sequence of games (of. Figure
p, 67). Tests of the observed mean divisions against those
expected by the norm were not significant. However, the
mean divisions differed significantly from an expected mean
of 50.00 which Is predicted by minimum power theory.
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Finally, coalition formation was affected by the degree
of attraction between players. Consistent with the results
of Vlnacke and colleagues, the dominant strategy for strangers
was for the two players with the smallest amount of resources
to band together against the player with the largest amount
of resources. Thus, the behavior of non-formed dyads sup*-
ported minimum resource theory. On the other hand, formed
dyads (friends) conformed more closely to a minimum power
Interpretation. The greater the di^adlc attraction, the less
accurately minimum resource theory predicted frequency of
allying. These findings are directly opposed to the suggested
advice given by Oamson (1964) to minimum power theorists.
He suggested that they ’’use subjects who have no established
social relationships with each other and no prospects of a
continuing relationship after the experiment” (p. 105 ). In
the present study. It was the ’’strangers" who adhered most
closely to the expectations of minimum resource theory. Con-
versely, subjects with the most firmly established relation-
ships were the ones who supported minimum power theory the
most. Perhaps, Gamson*s advice should be taken with a
”graln-of-salt”
I
In summary, while support for both minimum resource and
minimum power theories was obtained, the results were most
consistent with minimum resource predictions. The greatest
evidence came from (1) groups or dyads composed of
strangers,
(2) coalitions Initiated and formed during
the first block of
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three games, (3) divisions of payoff throughout the sequence
of games, and (i*) recipients of coalition offers. Minimum
power predictions were primarily supported by (1) changes
in the frequency of coalitions initiated and formed after
the first block of games, and (2) groups or dyads composed
of friends.
It is concluded that, at present, minimum resource
theory offers the best explanation of coalescing behavior.
The two findings supportive of minimum power theory appear
to be discrepant with minimum resource predictions. However,
it is suggested that an equity or parity norm may account
for these findings as well.
First, changes across games are observed in the fre-
quency with which coalitions are initiated and formed by
players possessing various resources. If player A allies
with player B in a particular game and B benefits the most
from the alliance, it is only equitable or "fair” that he
reciprocate the favor in a later game. In this manner, A
may then receive an amount proportionate to his investments
(parity norm). Thus, the norm states that one should benefit
those who have benefited him; one should pay his "debts.”
If this norm is envoked by players during an experimental
session, alliances will occur in all resource combinations,
depending upon which player owes another player a favor.
This may be one explanation why ^ initiates more frequently
over games and why ^*-3 ooalltlons occur with a frequency
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greater than zero.
Secondly, players with prior dyadic experience form
coalitions more equally In all resource combinations than
players with no prior experience. Prior established relation-
ships weaken minimum resource predictions. Attracted dyads
enter the experimental setting having already formed an
alliance. In effect, they have played a number of games In
which Investments have been made and debts Incurred, Accord-
ing to the parity norm, each member of the dyad would be ex-
pected to benefit the other member because of their past
exchanges. In many real-life situations (including labora-
tory research), the amount of resources one possesses may
actually be less Important than the Interpersonal relation-
ship one has with another person. In other words, relation-
ships with others are often more salient than the "distribution
of resources."
pyadlc Attraction Hypotheses
Based upon an exchange theory of interaction, a dis-
tinction was made among dyads of varying degrees of attraction.
Non-formed or stranger dyads exchanged rewards and costs for
the first time In the experimental situation. Forming or
acquaintance dyads had Interacted prior to the experiment
and were assumed to have experienced some Involvement with
each other. Formed or friend dyads were highly attracted
to
each other and had interacted In some depth prior to
the
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©xperlment. Generally, these dyads were roommates.
It was predicted that friends and acquaintances would be
more cooperative In an experimental game than would strangers;
furthermore, friends were expected to be more competitive than
acquaintances. Cooperative behavior was measured as a high
frequency of dyad alliances and mutual Initiations together
with proportionate divisions of the payoff.
As predicted, friend dyads Initiated and formed more
coalitions than stranger dyads. Contrary to expectations,
acquaintance dyads did not Initiate or coalesce more frequently
than friend or stranger dyads. Moreover, dyads did not differ
significantly In their mean divisions of payoff. However,
consistent with the other findings, the trend was for friends
to divide the payoff most proportionately, then strangers, and
acquaintances most disproportionately. Friends played to
maximize their .joint outcomes, while acquaintances and
strangers generally played to maximize their Individual out-
comes. All dependent measures showed that friends were con-
sistently more cooperative than acquaintances and strangers.
Why were friends more cooperative than acquaintances In
the present experimental game situation? One explanation is
that friends find It more rewarding to cooperate than to com-
pete. It Is more rewarding to ally with a friend, for his
gains are also one’s own gains. Moreover, one’s costs are
greatly reduced when he Interacts with someone similar to
himself. In Thlbaut and Kelley's terms (1959). "friendship
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reflects a more complete correspondence of outcomes or
commonality of interests" (p, 210). As rewarding behavior is
reciprocated, each partner experiences greater and greater
positive outcomes from the relationship. Each derives pleasure
from rewarding the other. Ey the nature of their relation-
ship they have, in effect, formed an alliance before entering
the experimental setting. The greater their attraction, the
greater their allegiance in everyday situations. Therefore,
when a highly attracted dyad is placed into a coalition game,
the alliance which they brought with them into the game setting
continues and they ally more frequently with each other rather
than with someone neither of them know. Their behavior in the
game is but one small segment of their interpersonal interaction
which extends into the past and is expected to extend into
the future.
A second explanation suggests that the original hypotheses
are correct, but only in situations where the costs of compe-
tition are minimal. Perhaps the monetary payoff in the present
study was so rewarding that it was too costly for friends not
to cooperate. If money had not been used as payoff, friends
could have rivaled and competed against each other with only
minimal costs. With the introduction of money as payoff,
however, the players were more highly motivated and involved
in the game. Consistent with the first explanation given
above, friends would rather share their winnings with
someone
they liked than with someone they didn’t know.
Furthermore,
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because of the formed nature of their relationship, they
could expect a more equitable division of the payoff with
their friend than with a stranger.
It should be mentioned that the hypotheses of this study
were formulated prior to the decision to use monetary payoff.
At that time the reward for winning a game was simply 100
points. With such low costs In the situation, the reasoning
and expectations given in Chapter II were highly tenable. The
research of various other Investigators supported the notion
that formed relationships would be more competitive tham
forming relationships (Berkowitz, 1958; Gamson, 196lb; Thibaut
& Kelley, 1959), More recently, Gamson (1984), In offering
advice to an anticompetitive theorist, also suggested that
subjects should not ”be so close that they feel comfortable
with the open expression of conflict; their relationships
should be fragile enough that the tension created by vigorous
bargaining is a threat. Polite acquaintances who value each
other *s good opinion and propriety in the conduct of social
relationships should support anticompetitive theory In their
coalition behavior" (p. 105).
Monetary rewards were Introduced into the procedure
after pilot groups had played the game. Tlie most prevalent
suggestion made by the pilot subjects was that they would
have behaved differently had there been money involved.
Al-
most all pilot subjects commented that the game would have
been more Interesting and "fun" had they been
playing for
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real money. Thus, It was decided to Incorporate monetary
payoff Into the procedure before the sixty experimental
groups were run.
l^ie only standard coalition study which has used monetary
payoff manipulated different types of Incentive conditions
(e.g.. Immediate payoff, delayed payoff), but not different
levels of payoff (Vlnacke, 196^1). No significant differences
were found between conditions. However, It has been shown
that game playing behavior may be strikingly different when
subjects are playing for real rather than Imaginary money
(Gallo & McCllntock, 19^5 ) . Gallo's experiment replicated
Deutsch and Krauss' (19^0) simulated trucking game. In con-
trast to the uncooperative behavior exhibited by subjects
playing under Imaginary money conditions, subjects playing
under real money conditions cooperated In order to win a
large sura of money. It was also found that "the real money
^s showed an entirely different pattern of play than the
Imaginary money Ss" (p. ?6). For example, dyads playing for
real money showed an Increase In cooperative behavior over
trials and a decrease In the use of threats. In retrospect,
then, the original attraction hypotheses may have been
supported If a monetary payoff had not been given. It Is
concluded that friends were more cooperative than acquaintances
because they found It more rewarding to cooperate than to
compete and because the monetary payoff made It too costly
for friends not to cooperate.
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Finally, brief mention should be made of the similarity
between the behaviors of acquaintances and strangers. Stranger
groups were composed of three randomly selected subjects.
The only restriction was that none had chosen the others on
the "student Questionnaire." Thus, strangers were selected
from the s€ime class so that a soclometrlc measure was avail-
able for determining the composition of groups. Although th»?
classes were large, strangers In the same experimental group
may have seen one another prior to the experiment. The other
participants In one*s group may not have been "total"
strangers — their faces may have loolced "familiar." It Is
possible, therefore, that acquaintances and strangers were
more similar to each other than were acquaintances and friends.
Ideally, strangers should have been Individuals who had never
seen each other before. This may not have been true In every
group. Where It was not true, the game behavior of acquaintances
and strangers would be expected to resemble each other somewhat.
Other researchers have found, for example, that "unacquainted"
and "fairly friendly" subjects did not differ In their level
of cooperation In a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Oskamp &
Perlman, 1965)*
Sex liypotheses
As predicted, males Initiated and formed algnlfloantly
more coalitions than did females. In addition,
unsucoeeaful
attempts to ally were made more frequently by males
than by
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females; 6556 of the unsuccessful attempts were made by males
and 35^ by females. Thus, male behavior was generally more
competitive than female behavior.
Consistent with previous results (Bond & Vlnacke, I96I;
Vlnackej 1959i 1962; Vlnacke & Stanley, 1962), then, support
was obtained for exploitative (masculine) and accommodative
(feminine) strategies of play. A procedural modification in
the present study eliminated one alternative frequently
chosen by females — the formation of triple alliances. The
rationale for the exclusion of this alternative was simply
to provide a more stringent test of the bond of attraction
between friends and acquaintances. The alternatives were to
play independently or to coalesce with a strsuiger or a friend
(acquaintance). Therefore, it was more difficult for all of
the players to band together than in studies which permitted
triple alliances.
Interestingly, however, several female triads actually
formed a type of triple alliance. One method was to rotate
alliances among the three players in a consistent pattern
without regard to resource assignments; the three players
would end up equally if all divisions of payoff were 50-50.
A second method employed by one female triad was to play
independently on all games and never coalesce. They reasoned
that each player would probably be assigned a weight of
4
equally often and if 4 always received the 100 points
their
winnings would be equal. Their reasoning was correct;
each
8^
received ^0 points or one dollar. Both of these methods
were forms of accommodative strategy.
The hypothesis that males would agree upon less pro-
portionate divisions of payoff than females was not supported.
This may have been due, in part, to the adherence by most sub-
jects to a parity norm belief. The data Indicated that the
100 points were generally divided according to the resources
assigned to the players. It was not too surprising that
females adhered to this norm. If, In fact, females were oriented
"toward the end of arriving at an equitable or *falr' outcome
of maximum satisfaction (or at least Justice) to all con-
cerned" (Bond & Vlnacke, 19^1, p. 71-72), divisions of payoff
according to a parity norm vjould further this objective.
Each player would receive an amount proportionate to his
Investment. This would have been the most equitable and fair
agreement that could have been reached. To have divided the
payoff In a 50-50 split may have been perceived as inequitable;
one player would have received too much for his investment
and the other too little. Deviation from the norm toward
50-50 divisions would only have occurred If the players ad-
hered to an equalizing norm rather than to a parity norm.
It Is perhaps more surprising that males did not deviate
fi»om the parity norm to a greater extent than they did. Be-
cause of their competitiveness In bargaining, one would expect
greater departures from the norm. However, the procedure
of
this study did not permit a third party to propose
counter-
85
offers to those discussing a possible alliance until a one-
minute time limit had expired. This restriction may have
restrained the amount of bargaining displayed by the players.
In general, the findings of this study support the re-
sults of Vlnaoke and colleagues i males. Individually or
collectively, were primarily concerned with winning, whereas
females were more concerned with arriving at an equitable
outcome
.
Methodological Considerations
Tlie major methodological consideration concerns how one
can make the experimental situation more realistic and in-
volving for the participants. As the game Is now played,
subjects quickly learn that It Is determined; that one must
be In an alliance to win. A person with a resource assignment
of 2 or 3 can never win without forming an alliance. There
are two potential ways In which motivation can be Increased
In the game and greater Involvement achieved.
l^e first is to allow each player to throw his own die
rather than move simultaneously with the other players after
the experimenter has thrown the die. If each player were
allowed to throw his own die and move Independently of the
other players, the game would be perceived as Involving much
more risk. If there were numerous spaces on the game board,
the person with the largest resource assignment would still
win. Although the game would become more probabilistic, It
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would Qssentlally remain determined. It is suggested that
with non
-simultaneous throws of the die^ fewer overall coali-
tions will be formed. It is further suggested that more
unsuccessful Initiations will be attempted under non-
simultaneous than under simultaneous conditions. Players
will prefer "to go it alone" or be risk-takers rather than
accept an offer which does not meet their approval. Theo-
retically, the non-simultaneous condition would be an inter-
esting test of minimum resource and minimum power theories.
Do the two weaker players form more coalitions under this
condition than under a simultaneous condition or do coalitions
form more equally among all resource combinations?
The second way in which Involvement may be Increased ‘is
to allow unlimited bargaining while offers to ally are being
exchanged and debated. As the game was played in thl? study,
the player not Included in a discussion was not allowed to
Interrupt until a one-minute time limit had expired. This
restriction may have reduced the amount of competitiveness
displayed by the players in two related ways. First, without
counter-offers from a third player, members of a bargaining
dyad may have been reluctant not to accept an offer when it
was given. Second, because of this reluctance, the frequency
of unsuccessful initiations may have been disproportionately
low. There was a definite risk Involved in rejecting one
offer while hoping for a better deal with the third player.
If accurate recording and coding could be achieved
through
mechanical devices, the communication restriction
could be
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eliminated in favor of unlimited bargaining. It lo suggested
that with greater freedom to Initiate offers and counter-
offers, competitive behavior of the players would Increase.
It would be very Interesting to determine, for example. If
unlimited bargaining would result In more competitive be-
havior between members of friend dyads.
Suggestions for Further Research
Numerous questions for further research are suggested by
this study. The effects of varying amounts of monetary payoff
on coalescing behavior should be Investigated. Another area
for fruitful research Is an exaunlnatlon of the effects of
various resource and payoff contingencies on changes from
game to game In coalescing behavior. Finally, Interdependen-
cies among group members could be measured and then effect
on coalescing behavior determined. Let us briefly consider
each of these suggestions.
The results of this study suggest that If payoff is low
In a competitive game situation, friends can rival and oppose
one another Incurring little cost from their exchange. If
payoff Is high, however. It may be costly for friends not to
cooperate. To compete would result In lower overall outcomes
for both than would a cooperative alliance. Therefore, It Is
suggested that Increasing the stake or payoff would heighten
the differences In coalescing behavior between acquaintances
and friends. With Increased payoff, It becomes even more
88
valuable to reward one’s friend and more costly to compete
with him. With very large stakes, such as several thousand
dollars. It would not be In the friends' best Interests to
compete and Include a stranger In on the payoff. With very
small stakes, such as winning points or Imaginary money, the
friends may actually find It rewarding to rival and oppose
each other; there are no, or few, costs Incurred, Thus, the
greater the payoff In a competitive situation, the greater
should be the differences In cooperative behavior between
formed and forming relationships, Non-formed (stranger)
relationships should maintain the same strategy throughout
payoff levels — an adherence to a parity norm of Inter-
personal exchange. It would, of course, be Important to
determine the utility of the payoff for each person. Ten
dollars would not be valued equally by all participants,
A second area for further research Is an analysis of
the effects of various resource and payoff contingencies
on game to game changes In coalescing behavior. Which player
Initiates an offer to ally, which player accepts the offer,
and the terms of their agx*eement may depend on (l) the resources
possessed by each pleiyer during the preceding game and (2) the
accumulated outcomes of all preceding games. That Is,
coalitions formed. Initiators and recipients of offers to ally,
and/or divisions of payoff during a particular game could be
contingent upon resources assigned and outcomes obtained
during the previous game(s). Thus, the experimental situation
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could be structured with the nerabers of each group asslcnod
a pre
-determined sequence of weights rather than a random
assignment as in the present study. For example, each player
could keep the same weight throughout the sequence of games
Kelley and Arrowood's study (i960), or each player could
be assigned one weight for X games, another weight for X more
games, ej^ cetera
. E(y keeping resource assignments constant
from game to game, changes In coalescing behavior can be
systematically observed. It would also be possible to con-
struct a mathematical model to predict future coalescing
behavior
.
Finally, It is suggested that interdependencies among
group members may detemlne the nature of their coalescing
behavior. Most relationships are asymmetrical in that one
member may have more invested in the relationship, may be
more dependent upon it, or may be more highly attracted to
it than the other meraber(s). Initiations and concessions
of bargaining, for example, may be a function of the degree
of attraction between partners. It is suggested that the
person with the smallest investment in the relationship
should make fewer offers to ally and demand a larger share
of the payoff than the person with the greatest Investment.
latter person should be very receptive to offers from
his partner and agreeable to his proposed division of the pay-
off. A more refined measure of attraction is needed than the
sociometric questionnaire used in this study . One should be
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abl6 to aosess the Interdependenolee of the partners, their
degree of Involvement in and oommltment to the relationship,
and their satisfaction with the present association as opposed
to alternative relationships*
If the interdependencies among group members have been
assessed, it would be of interest to vary the composition of
the three-person group* For ejcample, all group members could
be friends or all could be acquaintances* The frequency with
which coalitions are initiated and formed between the three
friend dyads as well as their agreed upon divisions of payoff
should reflect the interdependencies of the members. It would
also be interesting to observe the frequency with whic)\ three
friends would form triple alliances as opposed to the number
formed by three acquaintances or three strangers. Furthermore
the groups could be composed of attracted dyads and a stranger
as in the present study, but the stranger could be an
accomplice of the experimenter. The role of the accomplice
would consist of presenting various prearranged offers to the
members of the attracted dyad in order to test the strength
of the bonds within the dyad* The amount of monetary payoff
could be manipulated so that alliances between a friend and
the stranger would be more rewarding than alliances between
friends. How large would the payoff need to be before one
friend allied with the stranger against the other friend?
Or, would friends forego easily attained rewards in
an
alternate relationship and band together for a lower
monetary
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payoff? In other words, what Is the cost of friendship?
The results of the present experiment suggest that the greater
the Interpersonal attraction, the greater the resistance will
be for accepting a high monetary payoff with a stranger
rather than a less rewarding alliance with one's partner.
Summary and Conclusions
While support for both minimum resource and minimum
power theories was obtained In this study. It Is concluded
that ralnlmiara resource theory currently offers the best
explanation of coalescing behavior. It was supported by
evidence from (l) groups or dyads composed of strangers,
(2) coalitions Initiated and fomed during the first block
of three games, (3) divisions of payoff throughout the sequence
of games, and (4) recipients of coalition offers. Minimum
power predictions were primarily supported by (1) changes In
the frequency of coalitions initiated and formed after the
first block of three games, and (2) groups or dyads composed
of friends. It Is suggested that a parity norm (minimum
resource theory) also accounts for the findings supportive
of minimum power theory: one should benefit those who have
benefited him during previous games.
Only partial support was obtained for the attraction
hypotheses. As predicted, friend dyads Initiated and formed
more coalitions than stranger dyads. But, contrary to
expectations, acqiiaintance dyads did not Initiate or coalesce
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more frequently than friend or stranger dyads. Moreover,
dyads did not differ signlfloantly in their divisions of
payoffs. Friends played to maximize their .lolnt outoomes,
while acquaintances and strangers generally played to maxi-
mize their individual outcomes. It is concluded that friends
were more cooperative than acquaintances because they found
it more rewai\iing to cooperate than to compete and because
the monetary payoff made it too costly for friends not to
cooperate.
As expected, males formed significantly more coalitions
than did females. They also Initiated successful and un-
successful offers to ally more frequently than did females.
However, no support was found for the hypothesis that males
would agree upon less proportionate divisions of payoff than
females. Both males and females adhered to the parity norm
in dividing the payoff. It is concluded that r.^les were
generally concerned with winning (exploitative behavior)
whereas females were more concerned with arriving at an
equitable outcome (accommodative behavior).
Two methods of motivating subjects to become more
Involved in the competitive board game were suggested. The
first was to allow each player to throw his own die rather
than move simultaneously with the other players. The
second was to allow unlimited bargaining while offers to
ally were being exchanged and debated. Suggested areas for
further research included investigations of the effects of
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(l) varying amounts of monetary payoff, (2) various resource
and payoff contingencies, and (3) Interdependencies among
group members on coalescing behavior.
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STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Name:
rast Initial
^ Sex:
Campus Acldx*esBt Phone:
Class: (clrole one)
freshman sophomore Junior senior graduate special
Major:
Area of Interest within major:
.
.
Career plane :
List the full name for as many as six persons in this class
of your own sex that you know and like:
abcdefgh
abcdefgh
abcdefgh
abcdefgh
abcdefgh
abcdefgh
For each name, circle all letters that correctly describe
your relationship with ihat person. At least one letter will
prc^bably apply to each person:
a * a person you know well -• a "best friend".
]0 - your roommate.
c • a sorority sister or fraternity brother.
d - a resident of your dormitory or house floor.
e « a person you see frequently in social situations.
(for excunple: double dates, parties, movies. Hatch, etc.)
f « a person you have known for one year or longer.
^
a person with whom you are Just beginning to associate.
h - a person with whom you hope to become better acquainted.
4

